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involve pervasive racial disparities. Scholars and advocates tend to see these harms
as collateral to policing and seek to address them with “harm-regulating” tools such
as civil rights suits, prosecution of police officers, elimination of qualified immunity,
more Department of Justice investigations, civilian review boards, and the like.
Harm-regulation techniques are unlikely to be successful, however, as we see all
too well in practice. Harm is not collateral to policing, it is innate to it. We call police
“crimefighters,” we train them in using force and enforcing the law, and we deploy
them to do this. So, it should come as no surprise that what we get is force, and law
enforcement. And that this approach does little to address the sorts of social
problems—from homelessness to substance abuse to mental illness—that police
confront every day.
This Article takes an entirely different approach to the harms of policing, looking
to the very core of the policing function itself. It disaggregates what police officers are
called upon to do daily into their constituent functions, asking in each instance: are
force and law the appropriate responses, and if not, what are? What would be a better
response to the needs of the public? Crimefighting actually is a very small part of what
police do every day, and the actual work they are called upon to do daily requires an
entirely different range of skills, among them: mediation skills to address conflict,
social work skills to get people the long-term solutions they need, interviewing and
investigative skills to really solve crimes, and victim-assistance. Yet, police are barely
trained in any of this, so it is no surprise harm is the result.
This Article suggests a range of solutions designed not to reduce harm collaterally,
but to reduce altogether the footprint of force and law. We either need to change
fundamentally the nature of the policing agency workforce, or move police to the
background, bringing in other agencies of government to address the actual problems
police face on a day-to-day basis. At the end, this Article proposes a totally novel idea
for a whole new system of generalist first responders, to replace much of policing as
we know it. And it argues that we must reduce criminalization. In short, to reduce
the harms of policing, we need to reimagine public safety from the ground up.
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INTRODUCTION
The last few years have seen sustained attention to the harms of policing,
and with good reason. Almost one thousand people are shot and killed by the
police each year.1 Countless more are subjected to lesser uses of force.2 The
police conduct countless pedestrian and traffic stops annually; far too many
of the stops are pretextual or outright unconstitutional, and most are
unproductive.3 Policing imposes severe racial disparities, often an inevitable
result of the tactics the police adopt.4 One could go on.
Over the last decade or more, the primary response from advocates and
scholars has been to seek to minimize or eliminate these harms. That is to say,
tighten up the constitutional rules of police search and seizure, so fewer of
them occur.5 Loosen the fetters of qualified immunity, so cops can be sued for

1 See John Sullivan, Liz Weber, Julie Tate & Jennifer Jenkins, Four Years in a Row, Police
Nationwide Shoot Nearly 1,000 People, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019, 11:26 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/four-years-in-a-row-police-nationwide-fatallyshoot-nearly-1000-people/2019/02/07/0cb3b098-020f-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html?utm_
1561715term=.e9a7ea16d070 [https://perma.cc/Q6DC-K6N8] (“[I]n each of the past four years police
nationwide have shot and killed almost the same number of people—nearly 1,000.”).
2 See ELIZABETH DAVIS, ANTHONY WHYDE & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU
OF JUST. STAT., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 1 (2018) (“In 2015 . . . about
53.5 million persons . . . had experienced some type of contact with the police during the prior 12 months.”).
3 See Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the
United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 736 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0858-1
[https://perma.cc/R3AB-YV58] (“We assessed racial disparities in policing in the United States by
compiling and analysing a dataset detailing nearly 100 million traffic stops . . . . Our results indicate
that police stops and search decisions suffer from persistent racial bias . . . .”); POLICING PROJECT,
N.Y.U. SCH. OF L., AN ASSESSMENT OF TRAFFIC STOPS AND POLICING STRATEGIES IN
NASHVILLE
3
(2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/
5bf2d18d562fa747a554f6b0/1542640014294/Policing+Project+Nashville+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3J8Y-GZ83] (finding that the Nashville Police Department conducted an above-average number of
stops that produced racial disparities but did not reduce crime rates); Stephen Rushin & Griffin
Edwards, An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming
Apr. 2021) (manuscript at 57) (on file with author) (“[O]ur analysis suggests that rules granting police
discretion in traffic stops may lead to more traffic stops of drivers of color . . . .”).
4 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 23-26 (2010); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 425, 427 (1997) (exploring the “discretionary nature of pretextual stops and their discriminatory
effect on African-Americans and Latinos”); David A. Harris, Essay, “Driving While Black” and All
Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
544, 546 (1997) (describing the pervasiveness of “driving while black”).
5 See infra Section I.A (noting that “in the wake of police protests in 2020, many reform efforts
have been directed primarily at harm reduction, such as proposals to ban chokeholds or eliminate
qualified immunity for police officers from damage awards”).
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misconduct.6 Favor criminal prosecutions of cops.7 Have more Department of
Justice investigations.8 All are urged with the goal of ensuring that there are
fewer stops, searches, uses of force, and arrests.
This Article takes a distinctly different approach. Rather than focus on
regulating the harms that follow from policing, it urges us to dig deeper, to
examine critically the policing function itself. To look not only at the
symptoms, serious though they unquestionably are, but at the underlying
problem or problems that generate them.
Until we look through the harms, to the core of policing, the best we can
expect is incremental change. That is because harm is innate to policing.9
Tightening up the rules on things like stops and arrests is not going to make
them go away; at best it will reduce them. Nor is tightening up those rules
going to be easy: because courts are loath to second-guess the decisions of
officers, constitutional law affords the police enormous leeway.10
More centrally, when we focus primarily on the collateral harms of
policing, we take our eyes off what ought to be the ultimate goal of society:
public safety. Policing agencies like to say they are in the business of public
safety.11 The question we need to be asking is whether public safety is what
6 See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 27 (2017)
(explaining when qualified immunity cannot be invoked); Stephen R. Reinhardt, Essay, The Demise
of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences,
113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1246 (2015) (describing the Supreme Court’s holding in Hope v. Pelzer that
“an official actor is not protected by qualified immunity simply because ‘the very action in question
has [not] previously been held unlawful’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739 (2002))); Brief of Cato Inst. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22, I.B. v. Woodard, 2019
WL 1116409 (2019)(No. 18-1173) (arguing that the Supreme Court should reconsider qualified
immunity because it has “the effect of abetting constitutional violations”).
7 See, e.g., Christopher E. Stone, Introduction to VERA INST. OF JUST., PROSECUTING POLICE
MISCONDUCT: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 3 (1998),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/prosecuting-police-misconduct-reflections-on-therole-of-the-u-s-civil-rights-movement/legacy_downloads/misconduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PHSLGCT] (“[W]hen police themselves violate the criminal law, someone must prosecute them.”).
8 See Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement”
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 797 (2016) (“[I]n the wake of
ongoing fatal interactions between Black Americans and police, the DOJ, advocates, and city officials
are under pressure to finalize the terms of various consent decrees and settlement agreements.”).
9 See EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 39 (1970)
(“[T]he police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force
in society.”); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 762 (2012) (“Police
officers are granted immense authority by the state to impose harm.”).
10 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 73 (2017)
(citing numerous examples of judicial permissiveness to police and explaining why); see also infra
note 40 (arguing that courts show deference to police decisions because of a lack of both data and
certainty to conclude differently).
11 See, e.g., About NYPD, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/aboutnypd/about-nypd-landing.page [https://perma.cc/9F97-6KTB] (“The NYPD . . . is responsible
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we are getting. To be sure, at the least public safety must mean ensuring the
safety of individuals from government.12 But it also means things like being
able to get to school during the day without worrying about gunfire, and
having a secure place to sleep at night. It means being able to distinguish
between a public health problem, and one that immediately and necessarily
implicates the criminal law; mental illness, homelessness, and substance abuse
are the former, not the latter. It includes having some confidence that when
the police respond to a serious crime, they will not increase the trauma, will
investigate it competently, and in some respectable number of cases actually
will locate the perpetrator.13 The broader goal of public safety is not going to
be furthered by a strategy aimed primarily or solely on minimizing the
collateral harms of policing.
Finally, if public safety is our aim—as it assuredly should be—then it is
imperiled as much by the things the police fail to do, as by the things they do
(properly or otherwise); acts of omission, rather than commission. A strategy
of regulating and minimizing harm may get at the latter, but rarely at the
former. Failing to protect certain individuals or neighborhoods is a problem
equal in scope to over-policing, and it is addressed glancingly at best by harm
reduction strategies.14
If we truly want to achieve public safety, we need to look beyond
minimizing the harms of policing and focus on what it is exactly the police
do daily, asking whether the police are the institution best suited to the
panoply of societal needs they confront regularly. Policing in the United
States tends to be a one-size-fits-all endeavor that puts primacy on what is
unique about the police—using force and law—to achieve “public safety.”
Force and law, though, are an odd match, at best, for the actual problems the
police are called out daily to address. The police themselves recognize this.
Former Dallas Police Chief (and current Superintendent of the Chicago
Police) David Brown put it this way:

for . . . performing a wide variety of public safety, law enforcement, traffic management,
counterterror, and emergency response roles.”); Inside the LAPD, L.A. POLICE DEP’T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd [https://perma.cc/XV6M-GFK2] (“It is the mission of
the Los Angeles Police Department to safeguard the lives and property of the people we serve, to
reduce the incidence and fear of crime, and to enhance public safety while working with the diverse
communities to improve their quality of life.”).
12 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (“You must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.”).
13 I develop a broader conception of public safety, and explore the reasons why we have not
pursued it, in Barry Friedman, What Is Public Safety? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
14 See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2006) (“Over- and
underenforcement are twin symptoms of a deeper democratic weakness of the criminal system: its nonresponsiveness to the needs of the poor, racial minorities, and the otherwise politically vulnerable.”).
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We’re asking cops to do too much in this country. . . . We are. Every societal
failure, we put it off on the cops to solve. Not enough mental health funding,
let the cops handle it. . . . Here in Dallas we got a loose dog problem; let’s
have the cops chase loose dogs. Schools fail, let’s give it to the cops. . . . That’s
too much to ask. Policing was never meant to solve all those problems.15

Where Brown, and other police, get it wrong, though, is that these sorts of
social problems are and always have been what police are called upon to do
every day.16 The question we need to explore is whether policing as presently
conceived is up to it, or if some other approach would be better.
To figure out how best to achieve public safety in today’s world, and to
structure the role of police accordingly, we need to disaggregate the policing
function. We have to take apart and look critically at the various pieces of what
cops actually are called to do on a daily basis and ask in each instance what
skill set is necessary to perform that function well. Even the core function of
responding to crime involves other tasks—from victim counseling to collecting
forensic evidence—for which patrol officers are not necessarily suited.17
In disaggregating the policing function, we need to keep asking three
questions—all similar in appearance, but each emphasizing different things we
need to know to best utilize (or not utilize) the police to achieve public safety:
What is a cop DOING here? What is it exactly that the police are being asked
to do in any given situation? Have officers been trained adequately to do it?
What is a COP doing here? Are the police even the correct societal actor to
be responding to this problem? Is having the police respond to this problem—
as opposed to some other actor—making things better or worse?
What is a cop doing HERE? Finally, we need to look at and understand the
situational aspects of what a police officer confronts. Cops get tossed into all
kinds of rotten circumstances, regularly encountering people at their worst
moment.18 They patrol some of the toughest and poorest neighborhoods in the
nation. We should be asking what gave rise to the underlying situations the
police encounter and questioning whether those circumstances are something
society could or should be addressing in some way other than with the police.
15 Brady Dennis, Mark Berman & Elahe Izadi, Dallas Police Chief Says ‘We’re Asking Cops to Do
Too Much in This Country,’ WASH. POST (July 11, 2016, 10:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/07/11/grief-and-anger-continue-after-dallas-attacks-and-policeshootings-as-debate-rages-over-policing [https://perma.cc/RNY5-7BJV].
16 See JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 120 (1968) (describing how cops
dealt with “drunks” in the 1800s and administrators often referred to “drunkenness” as a “social or
medical problem”); see also infra Part II (exploring how police officers spend their time).
17 See infra Section II.B.
18 See Carma Hassan, California Police Buy Walk-to-Work Teen a Bicycle, CNN (Oct. 1, 2016, 11:54 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/01/us/california-police-bike-teen-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/8SY9HKQK] (“We meet people on their worst day—that’s just the nature of our business.”).

932

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 925

If public safety truly is our goal, we need to look for better ways to get
there than relying so heavily on the purveyors of force and law. To be sure,
many situations that are not solved by force and law still may require the
presence of force or the threat of punishment to get them under control.
Force and law are the “or else” of society, and they have their place.19 But if
optimal outcomes are our goal, we need to look for other approaches. That is
the task here: to look at the problems police confront daily, and ask if better
outcomes would result from addressing them in some way other than simply
with policing agencies as presently constituted.
Between the time this article was written, and the time it came into print,
the questions it asks reached the very top of the national agenda. In March of
2020, Breonna Taylor was killed in her apartment in Louisville, Kentucky, by a
SWAT raid gone very bad; in May of that year, George Floyd died at the hands
of the Minneapolis police. They were just two of many Black people killed by
the police, but following George Floyd’s death in particular, protests broke out
throughout the country that have not died down fully yet some four months
later. One of the primary reforms demanded by activists and protestors was to
“defund” the police, which is to say take financial resources from the police and
devote them to the real needs of struggling communities.20 Since that time,
activists, but also advocates, government officials, funders, and many more have
begun to explore reducing the footprint of the police, on precisely the grounds
offered here.21 This Article, seemingly a pipe dream of sorts at the time it
19 See BITTNER, supra note 9, at 42-44 (“[T]he role of the police is to address all sorts of human
problems when and insofar as their solutions do or may possibly require the use of force at the point
of their occurrence.”).
20 The defund movement includes among it police abolitionists, but many leaders seeking
transformation of policing in the United States do not take “defund” literally to mean eliminating
the police entirely. They share in common the belief that police are ill-equipped to address many of
the problems they are called upon to solve, and that other solutions that do not involve force or the
enforcement of the law are overdue. See Sam Levin, What Does ‘Defund the Police’ Mean? The Rallying
Cry Sweeping the US—Explained, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2020/jun/05/defunding-the-police-us-what-does-it-mean [https://perma.cc/7C4X-SJNR]
(explaining what defunding the police means); Christy E. Lopez, Defund the Police? Here’s What That
Really Means, WASH. POST (June 7, 2020, 6:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2020/06/07/defund-police-heres-what-that-really-means [https://perma.cc/R7QY-BEVZ]
(same); Scottie Andrew, There’s a Growing Call to Defund the Police. Here’s What It Means, CNN (June
17, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/what-is-defund-police-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/KY9Q-S2AF] (same).
21 See, e.g., Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defund-police.html
[https://perma.cc/9U5B-ET6U] (“We should redirect the billions that now go to police departments
toward providing health care, housing, education and good jobs.”); Interview by Chuck Todd with Alicia
Garza, Co-Founder, Black Lives Matter, NBC: MEET THE PRESS (June 7, 2020, 12:23 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-june-7-2020-n1226966 [https://perma.cc/L3BTC2MP] (“When we talk about defunding the police, what we’re saying is invest in the resources that
our communities need. . . . [W]hat we do need is increased funding for housing, we need increased
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originally was written, now provides a theoretical and empirical basis for change
that many people believe is urgently needed.
Part I of this Article explores the full breadth of harm caused by policing.
Section I.A focuses on the sorts of harms—the stops, the searches, the arrests—
that give rise to harm-reduction strategies. Section I.B then goes on to describe
an entirely different and additional set of harms caused by our over-reliance on
the police: the failure to resolve chronic social problems like homelessness,
substance addiction, and mental illness. Finally, Section I.C looks at the harms
of what often is referred to as underpolicing, the many things we don’t address
effectively—from serious gun violence to domestic violence to sexual abuse—
simply because the police are overwhelmed or undertrained to tackle these
issues. The constant theme in Part I is that familiar harm-reduction strategies
simply will not suffice to address this range of problems.
Part II turns to disaggregating the policing function, in order to show how
one-size-fits-all policing fails to further public safety. Section II.A explains
that police primarily are conceived of, and trained to be, purveyors of force
and law. Yet, in reality they spend their day dealing with a host of social
problems and requests for assistance to which force and law are inapposite.
Section II.B then disaggregates the policing function, skill by skill, tool by
tool, to ask what the various situations the police encounter actually require
for successful resolution.

funding for education, we need increased funding quality of life of communities who are over-policed
and over surveilled.”); MPD 150, ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: A 150 YEAR PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF THE
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2017), https://www.mpd150.com/wp-content/
themes/mpd150/assets/mpd150_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9UP-KF9Z] (calling for the “transfer of
resources from the police to projects, programs, and grassroots initiatives that meet people’s emergency
and long-term needs”); Alondra Cano, My Minneapolis Colleagues and I Are on Our Way to Ending Police
System, Healing the Community, USA TODAY (June 16, 2020 10:41 AM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2020/06/12/after-floyd-video-changed-police-reformistabolitionist/3177414001 [https://perma.cc/46MG-BLB9] (distinguishing between “a policing system”
and “community safety,” and calling for a “new model of public safety” that encompasses non-protective
safety functions, such as housing, schooling, employment access and healthcare). See generally ALEX S.
VITALE, THE END OF POLICING (2017) (arguing for alternatives to policing to make society safe);
Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3731173 (noting that calls for police reform reflect
concerns that a focus on policing denies people their collective input into what safety should mean);
Barry Friedman, Amid Calls to ‘Defund,’ How to Rethink Policing, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2020, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-calls-to-defund-how-to-rethink-policing-11592020861
[https://
perma.cc/G6P7-MX2M] (discussing altering the policing function); Roge Karma, We Train Police to be
Warriors—and Then Send Them Out to be Social Workers, VOX (July 31, 2020, 7:30 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/7/31/21334190/what-police-do-defund-abolish-police-reform-training
[https://perma.cc/AYK5-YH9M] (same); Ayelet Waldman, Should I Help Incarcerate the Man Who Tried
to Sexually Assault Me?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2020/09/should-i-want-man-who-tried-sexually-assault-me-behind-bars/616514
[https://perma.cc/
J8WF-6FGX] (same).
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Part III explores alternatives to one-size-fits-all policing, in order to achieve
a better set of solutions to society’s problems. There is, of course, more and
better training for cops, to help them deal with what they encounter in ways
that improve outcomes—and concomitantly reduce harms. It is unlikely today,
though, to believe that this alone will address the grave problems identified
here or satisfy those who are calling for fundamental change. Somewhat better
is the idea of “civilianizing” the police, i.e., bringing under the policing
umbrella individuals who are not “sworn” officers dedicated to force and law,
but who possess other skills necessary for what the police encounter on the
street. Finding a more interested audience today are “co-response” models
being trialed by various government agencies, such as sending skilled mental
health professionals out on calls requiring that expertise, so that police remain
the purveyors of force and law but take a distinct backseat to other approaches
that will work better in the long run. The biggest idea here, though, and perhaps
the most consequential, is the notion of one set of super-trained generalist first
responders—whether the police or something else entirely—who, much like
emergency medical technicians or emergency room doctors, have a broad
enough set of skills to triage and address what they are asked to do until longerterm solutions can be put in place.
We have been approaching public safety primarily from the perspective
of force and law for so long that changing course now (despite enthusiasm in
several quarters) will be a big pivot. But it turns out that the way we have
constructed policing agencies is neither fair to the police—because they
cannot hope to succeed in their task—nor optimal for society. It is high time
we took a different approach.
I. THE HARM OF THE ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL COP
Everyone wants to be safe—so much so that many people listen, almost
with a sense of wonder, to modern proponents of “defunding” the police, as
well as “abolition,” the movement to get rid of the police altogether.22 Yet,
22 See, e.g., Zeeshan Aleem, Democrats are Grappling with Calls to “Defund the Police”, VOX (June
14, 2020, 6:30 PM) https://www.vox.com/2020/6/14/21290877/democrats-defund-police-omar-clyburn
[https://perma.cc/432Z-93TS] (explaining that the majority of Americans were confused by and
opposed the phrase “defund the police”); Maya Dukmasova, Abolish the Police? Organizers Say It’s Less
Crazy Than It Sounds, CHI. READER (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/policeabolitionist-movement-alternatives-cops-chicago/Content?oid=23289710 [https://perma.cc/N8KC5R4R] (describing how police abolition, “an idea that still strikes many if not most in the mainstream
as absurd,” has gained traction among activists and “even within the world of criminal justice”); Jeffery
C. Mays, Who Opposes Defunding the N.Y.P.D.? These Black Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/nyregion/defund-police-nyc-council.html [https://perma.cc/
6LTG-YRAG] (explaining that many lawmakers in New York were worried that defunding the police
would disproportionally hurt high crime neighborhoods). For an excellent overview of the abolitionist
movement, and what it suggests for “reform” (as well as a comprehensive accounting of the abolitionist
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Tracey Meares, a deeply accomplished scholar of policing, who also is a
practitioner in the space and counts many police among her colleagues and
friends, writes “[p]olicing as we know it must be abolished before it can be
transformed.”23 She understands that to skeptical ears “it is nonsensical for
residents of high-crime neighborhoods to say that they want less policing, as
this is tantamount to saying that they wish violence would befall them.”24
Still, Meares explains, being safe also means “security from government
overreach and oppression,” and in this the police have failed so badly that
doing without the police seems preferable to some.25
It bespeaks how badly things have become in many communities, how
serious the harms of policing, for people to opt in any serious way for
abolition over an alternative that keeps the police on the streets. Yet, the
question is whether harm reduction strategies—even one as dramatic as
abolishing the police—are likely to be successful in ameliorating the full range
of harms surrounding policing today. The problem, as this Part makes clear, is
that the range of harms attendant policing is much broader than what harm
reduction strategies can hope to address. Ultimately something different is needed.
A. The Direct Harms of Policing
The direct harms of policing—the stops, the searches, the use of force, the
arrests, the resultant incarceration—are well known, and still are notable in
their volume and their racial bias. Police conduct untold millions of
pedestrian and traffic stops a year.26 In Nashville, with a population of just
under 650,000, police conducted nearly 450,000 traffic stops in 2012.27 In 2011,
in New York City, police made 700,000 pedestrian stops.28 A voluminous
literature establishes the racial disparity of police stops, which certainly was

literature), see generally Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108. CALIF. L.
Rev. 1781 (2020).
23 Tracey L. Meares & Vesla M. Weaver, Abolish the Police?, BOS. REV. (Aug. 1, 2017),
http://bostonreview.net/podcast-law-justice/tracey-l-meares-vesla-m-weaver-abolish-police
[https://perma.cc/ZZD4-ZJF4].
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See generally Pierson et al., supra note 3, at 736 (“More than 20 million Americans are stopped
each year for traffic violations . . . .”).
27 POLICING PROJECT, supra note 3, at 7; Nashville Population 2012, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=nashville+population+2012 [https://perma.
cc/VLF6-Z2NB].
28 CHRISTOPHER DUNN & MICHELLE SHAMES, N.Y. C.L. UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK IN
THE DE BLASIO ERA 1 (2019), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/
20190314_nyclu_stopfrisk_singles.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRQ2-WAVX] [hereinafter NYCLU,
STOP AND FRISK].
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true in both those places.29 Police shoot nearly one thousand people a year,
many of them unarmed.30 In 2015, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported
that nearly one million people a year experience lesser threats or uses of
force—and the federal government notoriously undercounts these
experiences.31 In twelve agencies studied by the Center for Policing Equity,
force was used almost four times as often against blacks as whites.32 Police
arrest roughly twelve million people a year—the Chicago Police made just
over eighty thousand arrests in 2017, more than seventy percent of which were
of African-Americans (and most of which were men).33
As a result of these tactics, the United States tops the list of countries that
are part of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) with an incarceration rate of 655 per 100,000 people; number two is
Turkey at 344, while England and Wales have 134.34 Fully 4.9 million people
cycle through American jails each year; at any given moment the population
stands at about 600,000.35 The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that in 2016
“Black males ages 18 to 19 were 11.8 times more likely to be imprisoned than
white males of the same age.”36

29 See, e.g., Pierson et al., supra note 3, at 736 (“[T]he bar for searching [B]lack and Hispanic
drivers [is still] lower than that for searching white drivers.”); NYCLU, STOP AND FRISK, supra
note 28, at 9 (showing racial disparities in police stops in New York City from 2014 to 2017);
POLICING PROJECT, supra note 3, at 7 (“Over the course of many years, black drivers have been
stopped at a higher rate than white drivers relative to their percentage of Nashville’s population.”).
30 See Sullivan et al., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
31 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 16; German Lopez, The FBI Is Finally Taking Steps to Better
Track Police Use of Force Across the US, VOX (Oct. 14, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2016/10/14/13280906/police-force-data-fbi [https://perma.cc/4WPX-7437] (stating that
more than a quarter of civilian deaths caused by police are not reported as such by the FBI nor BJS).
32 PHILLIP ATIBA GOFF, TRACEY LLOYD, AMANDA GELLER, STEVEN RAPHAEL & JACK
GLASER, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, THE SCIENCE OF JUSTICE: RACE, ARRESTS, AND
POLICE USE OF FORCE 10, 25 (2016), https://policingequity.org/images/pdfs-doc/CPE_SoJ_RaceArrests-UoF_2016-07-08-1130.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH2V-AMSF].
33 CHI. POLICE DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT
2017, at 15, 82, 86 (2018),
https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Chicago-Police-Department-AnnualReport-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2UP-2CDS]; Arrest Trends by Offense, Age, and Race, OFF. OF
JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr_trend.asp?table_in=2
[https://perma.cc/7BFF-Q3U5].
34 Incarceration Rates in OECD Countries As of May 2020, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/300986/incarceration-rates-in-oecd-countries [https://perma.cc/J7FL-7ZB8].
35 ALEXI JONES & WENDY SAWYER, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, ARREST, RELEASE,
REPEAT: HOW POLICE AND JAILS ARE MISUSED TO RESPOND TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS (2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html [https://perma.cc/S3A8-HHBA]; WENDY
SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE
PIE 2020 (2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/R4LY-DDQE].
36 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2016, at 13 (2018),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3KX-TM4K].
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One reason for these staggering numbers is that police in the United
States have adopted proactive strategies of aggressive police enforcement,37
the logic and success of which are deeply dubious. The theory of proactive
policing is that frequent stops of low-level offenders will reduce violent
crime.38 An exhaustive study by the National Academy of Science said the
evidence to support this theory was at best mixed—with the exception of “hot
spot” approaches we will discuss much later.39
But these strategies continue to be used with impunity because the law
governing these harm-inducing policing strategies is notoriously vague and
generous to the police, fashioned by judges who are loathe to rein police in
or judge their conduct.40 Terry v. Ohio requires only reasonable suspicion to
stop someone.41 Graham v. Connor requires only that the use of force be
objectively reasonable, measured through the cops’ eyes at the time the use
of force occurs, caring not even about whether its use could have been avoided
if the police had used some other tactic before that point.42 Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista allows the police to arrest for any offense, even if the arrest makes
no sense from the perspective of avoiding harm or ensuring a suspect does
not flee.43 And so on.

37 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, MED., PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON CRIME
AND COMMUNITIES 16 (David Weisburd & Malay K. Majmundar eds., 2018) [hereinafter
PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS] (describing police departments’ shift in focus from the traditional

“obligations of the police to respond to the occurrence of crime and to investigate and bring offenders
to justice” to proactive “policing approaches that [would result] in crime prevention”).
38 See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465 [https://perma.cc/2WJL-NM92] (“If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome
panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to
identify a potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.”).
39 See PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS, supra note 37, at 170 tbl.4-1; Anthony A. Braga,
Brandon C. Welsh & Cory Schnell, Can Policing Disorder Reduce Crime? A Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 52 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 567, 581 (2015) (concluding, based on a meta-analysis,
that “[a]ggressive order maintenance strategies that target individual disorderly behaviors do not
generate significant crime reductions”).
40 See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827,
1891 (2015) (“Courts defer to policing decisions in part because they lack the data or confidence to
second-guess them.”); Clark Neily, Race, Traffic Stops, and Whren vs. United States, CATO
UNBOUND (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2019/04/10/clark-neily/race-traffic-stopswhren-vs-united-states [https://perma.cc/Y9UQ-R6JX] (pointing to the Court’s decision in Whren
v. United States as a “vivid manifestation of the ‘deferential standard’ that has spread like a disease
throughout the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence”).
41 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
42 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22)).
43 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“Atwater’s claim to live free of
pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise . . . . But we have
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Even if strategies to reduce these harms can and have had some degree of
success, it is important to be aware of their limits.44 All the more so because
in the wake of police protests in 2020, many reform efforts have been directed
primarily at harm reduction, such as proposals to ban chokeholds or eliminate
qualified immunity of police officers from damage awards.45 Harm reduction
is important, but at best it is only part of a solution, and at worst addressing
these essential but very specific matters creates an illusion that the problem
of policing is fixed when it is not.46 Perhaps no city has tried harder than New
York City to reduce these harms, where a combination of judicial decree,
federal monitoring, a City Council that ordered change, a Mayor’s Office
committed to it, and a police department that itself has joined in the
endeavor, have reduced the number of stops and arrests substantially.47 Even
traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served
by . . . case-by-case determinations . . . .”).
44 See, e.g., NYCLU, STOP AND FRISK, supra note 28, at 4 (noting that the number of reported stops
in New York City has dropped from almost 700,000 in 2011 to under 12,000 in 2017 because of reform
measures); SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, NINTH SYSTEMIC ASSESSMENT: USE OF FORCE 33-34 (2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/58e6a753ff7c50ebbad126f8/149151113066
/Ninth+Systemic+Assessment--Use+of+Force--FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/39EQ-PNED] (stating that
the Seattle Police Department’s use of force had steadily dropped after implementing new use of force
monitoring procedures and guidelines).
45 See, e.g., Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point Amid
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualifiedimmunity.html [https://perma.cc/N9NE-8V2G] (contending that qualified immunity has become a
center point for many police reform efforts); Jon Kamp & Scott Calbert, More Cities Ban Chokeholds,
Similar Restraints in Wake of George Floyd Protests, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2020, 6:37 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-cities-ban-chokeholds-similar-restraints-in-wake-of-georgefloyd-protests-11591821021 [https://perma.cc/8Y7A-WM68] (discussing how many cities have
focused on chokehold bans in response to recent protests); Tyler Kendall, Qualified Immunity Is at the
Forefront of the Debate on Policing, CBS NEWS (July 7, 2020, 1:12 PM), https://www.
cbsnews.com/news/qualified-immunity-policing-debate [https://perma.cc/NP8P-V75X] (discussing
how qualified immunity has become a “focal point” for criminal justice reformers).
46 See Sam Levin, “It’s Not About Bad Apples:” How US Police Reforms Have Failed to Stop
Brutality and Violence, GUARDIAN (June 16, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2020/jun/16/its-not-about-bad-apples-how-us-police-reforms-have-failed-to-stop-brutalityand-violence [https://perma.cc/8MVN-PLDN] (arguing that a variety of harm reduction techniques
in policing have failed); Joel Rubin, LAPD Violence Against George Floyd Protests Erode a Decade of
Reform, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-0614/lapd-protest-history-criticism-heavy-tactics [https://perma.cc/3FTQ-W5PH] (describing the
constant cycle of reform on erosion of reform with the LA police department); Aylin Woodward &
Michelle Mark, Research Shows There Are at Least 6 Proven Ways to Reduce Police Brutality—and 2
Strategies That Don’t Work, BUS. INSIDER (June 3, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://www.
businessinsider.com/research-based-methods-of-reducing-police-violence-2020-6 [https://perma.cc
/9FBV-QZLQ] (arguing that the evidence may not support that harm reduction techniques like
chokehold bans help decrease police violence).
47 See generally ELIZABETH GLAZER, NYC MAYOR’S OFF. OF CRIM. JUST., STRATEGIC PLAN
FISCAL YEARS 2019–2021, http://criminaljustice.cityofnewyork.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/156171511/
Strategic-Plan-2019-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/W43F-RANB] (describing four priorities and the
accompanying strategies to “reduce growing jail and prison populations while keeping crime low”).
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yet, the NYPD made nearly 230,000 arrests in 2017.48 The Nashville police,
which apparently also determined to lower the number of traffic stops,
nonetheless made 250,000 in 2017.49 In 2010, long after these harms of policing
were of concern, there still were 80% more arrests for drug possession than
in 1990.50
B. Unaddressed Chronic Social Harms
The deeper difficulty with a harm reduction strategy, however, is that
much of policing is not proactive, but reactive, and we won’t ameliorate
policing’s harms until we address the underlying social issues that cause
people to call the police in the first place. Police are called, again and again,
to handle situations that involve domestic violence, substance abuse, mental
illness, homelessness, and much more. People call 911 because they sense
trouble or feel threatened. Some of the calls are makeweight—as a society,
we’ve been treated to one example after another of the police being called on
someone simply for living while black.51 Still, many are driven by real problems
that policing exacerbates, but for which there often is no alternative at present.
Domestic violence presents just this sort of chronic problem. At least
fifteen and possibly more than fifty percent of calls to police departments are
about domestic violence; they comprise the single largest category of calls
that police departments receive.52 These calls hardly can be ignored—indeed,
as we will see, a frequent complaint about police is that they do not respond.
And in many jurisdictions, arrest is not merely an option; it is mandated by
law.53 Yet although police departments have stepped up enforcement of
48 Adult Arrests 18 and Older: 2010–2019, N.Y. STATE DIV. CRIM. JUST. SERVS.,
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/nyc.pdf [https://perma.cc/84BJ-TYP8].
49 POLICING PROJECT, supra note 3, at 7.
50 HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990–
2010, at 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf [https://perma.cc/67V5-R896];
id. at 12 (“State and local law enforcement agencies made an estimated 1,336,500 arrests for drug
possession or use in 2010.”).
51 See Henry Grabar & Mark Joseph Stern, The Privilege of 911, SLATE (May 10, 2018, 7:10 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/in-america-calling-911-is-still-a-privilege-of-beingwhite.html [https://perma.cc/ADK6-5BVC] (“In Philadelphia, it was Starbucks while black. In
Rialto, California, Airbnb while black. And in New Haven, Connecticut, trying to pull an all-nighter
while black.”).
52 ANDREW R. KLEIN, NAT’L INST. JUST., PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 1
(2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKH9-USV6].
53 See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 239 n.2 (2005) (listing
state mandatory arrest laws); Radha Iyengar, Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence?
Evidence from Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 85, 86 tbl.1 (2009)
(providing an overview of state mandatory arrest laws).
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domestic violence, arrest has not been shown to have a statistically significant
deterrent effect.54
Mental illness displays a similar cycle of call, arrest, release, and repeat.
About one in ten calls for service the police receive are generated by
individuals with mental disabilities or difficulties.55 Because police response
does not address the underlying problems, those who are diagnosed with
mental illness are prone to re-arrest, re-conviction, and re-incarceration.56 In
Los Angeles, sixty-seven people with mental illness accounted for 536 calls
for service in eight months in 2004.57 In Lexington, Kentucky, police came to
many locations of people struggling with mental illness three or more times
a year.58 Of 148 similar incidents in Honolulu, police “recognized the person
on sight” ninety-four of those times.59
Homelessness is yet another problem to which police are called
constantly. Studies suggest between one-fifth and two-thirds of homeless
people have been arrested one or more times in their adult lives.60 In Portland,
Oregon, in 2017, homeless individuals constituted fifty-two percent of arrests,
though they are less than three percent of the city’s population.61 Homeless
individuals account for a significant percentage of those drawn into the
criminal justice system by other means as well. Denver police issued over
20,000 tickets in a four-year period under a variety of anti-homeless

54 See Richard B. Felson, Jeffrey M. Ackerman & Catherine Gallagher, Police Intervention and
the Repeat of Domestic Assault 18 (June 2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/210301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2H8-CU5E] (finding that arrests have a small and statistically insignificant
effect on the likelihood of reoffending in domestic violence cases); Iyengar, supra note 53, at 97
(finding mandatory arrest policies may increase intimate-partner homicide).
55 D ORRIS A. F ULLER, H. R ICHARD L AMB, M ICHAEL B IASOTTI & JOHN SNOOK,
TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., OVERLOOKED IN THE UNDERCOUNTED: THE ROLE OF
MENTAL ILLNESS IN FATAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS 1 (2015), https://
www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/overlooked-in-the-undercounted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26XL-TW2R].
56 See generally William D. Bales, Melissa Nadel, Chemika Reed & Thomas G. Blomberg,
Recidivism and Inmate Mental Illness, 6 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOCIO. 40 (2017) (discussing the
relationship between severity of mental illness and recidivism).
57 MELISSA REULAND, MATTHEW SCHWARZFELD & LAURA DRAPER, COUNCIL STATE
GOV’TS JUST. CTR., LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES 7 (2009).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Pamela J. Fischer, Alan Ross & William R. Breakey, Correlates of Arrest in a Baltimore
Homeless Population, 20 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 385, 386 (1993); Margot B. Kushel, Judith A.
Hahn, Jennifer L. Evans, David R. Bangsberg & Andrew R. Moss, Revolving Doors: Imprisonment
Among the Homeless and Marginally Housed Populations, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1747, 1748-49 (2005).
61 Rebecca Woolington & Melissa Lewis, Portland Homeless Accounted for Majority of Police
Arrests in 2017, Analysis Finds, OREGONIAN (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.oregonlive.com/
portland/2018/06/portland_homeless_accounted_fo.html [https://perma.cc/DHB4-7XYL].
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ordinances.62 As a result, jails and prisons are full of people who were
homeless prior to their incarceration.63 And yet, this cycle of response, arrest,
and incarceration seems to get us nowhere. In Denver a group of just 250
longtime homeless people racked up a collective average of 1,500 arrests and
14,000 days in jail per year; the 20,000 summonses went to 4,000 people.64 In
Seattle, over 1,300 people had four or more bookings a year, of which fiftynine percent were homeless.65
Substance abuse and dependence also are prominent problems at which
we throw police and the criminal justice system, often unsuccessfully. In 2017
the leading basis of arrests was for drug abuse violations or driving under the
influence—a total of about 1.6 million arrests.66 Of the 2.3 million people
behind bars in 2006, 84.8% of these inmates, over 1.9 million in total, were
substance involved.67 Here, too, people cycle in and out of the criminal justice
system without addressing the underlying problem. Substance-involved
inmates have, on average, 5.3 past arrests while their non-substance involved
peers report an average of only 2.5 past arrests.68
We won’t ameliorate the harms caused or exacerbated by policing unless
and until we get at the underlying problems themselves. A report in San
Francisco found that “the City spent $20.6 million in calendar year 2015 for
62 ARIEL SCHREIBER & BECCA BUTLER-DINES, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER HOMELESS
ADVOCACY POLICY PROJECT, TOO HIGH A PRICE: WHAT CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS
COSTS COLORADO 1 (2016), https://www.law.du.edu/documents/homeless-advocacy-policyproject/Denver-Spotlight.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X5C-3AU4]; see also id. at 2 (“Despite constituting
less than one percent of Denver’s population, over the last five years, from 40% to 72% of citations
under [panhandling, curfews and closures] ordinances have been issued to homeless individuals.”).
63 See Dale E. McNiel, Renée L. Binder & Jo C. Robinson, Incarceration Associated with
Homelessness, Mental Disorder, and Co-Occurring Substance Abuse, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 840, 842
(2005) (finding that around sixteen percent of admittees to San Francisco County Jail in a six-monthlong study were homeless); Greg A. Greenberg & Robert A. Rosenheck, Jail Incarceration,
Homelessness, and Mental Health: A National Study, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 170, 173 (2008) (“[T]he
rate of homelessness among jail inmates was approximately 7.5 to 11.3 times the annual rate of
homelessness in the general population.”).
64 Liz Gelardi, Denver Apartment for Homeless Will House 250, THE DENVER CHANNEL (Jan.
28, 2016, 1:17 AM), https://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-news/denver-using-86m-loanto-build-apartments-for-chronically-homeless-people [https://perma.cc/49ZE-YB6Y]; SCHREIBER
& BUTLER-DINES, supra note 62, at 1.
65 Marc Stiles & Coral Garnick, The Price of Homelessness: The Seattle Area Spends More than $1
Billion a Year on This Humanitarian Crisis, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Nov. 22, 2017, 2:47 PM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2017/11/16/price-of-homelessness-seattle-king-countycosts.html [https://perma.cc/6CZ6-V8DG].
66 Estimated Number of Arrests: United States, 2017, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-theu.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/table-29 [https://perma.cc/XVS8-ZNAF].
67 NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIV., BEHIND BARS
II: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 9-10 (2010), https://drugfree.
org/reports/behind-bars-ii-substance-abuse-and-americas-prison-population [https://perma.cc/
8LLS-P7JJ].
68 Id. at 20.
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sanctioning homeless individuals for violating quality of life laws,” of which
$18.5 million was attributable to police involvement, even though
“enforcement had no impact on the incidence of homelessness.”69 These folks
need social services they often are not receiving.
In short, people are subjected to criminal enforcement because the police
are called upon to tackle persistent social problems. Yet criminal enforcement
does little if anything to address the underlying difficulty, and likely
exacerbates it. Even if we could reduce arrests and other interactions with the
criminal justice system, that will not solve these underlying chronic problems.
C. The Harms of Underpolicing
The one thing that a strategy of harm reduction from policing certainly
won’t address is the harm caused by what typically is referred to as
underpolicing, which is to say, where the police already are not responding.
Alexandra Natapoff explains that underenforcement “takes various forms,
including unsolved homicides, permitted open-air drug markets, slow or
nonexistent 911 responses, and tolerance of pervasive, low levels of violence,
property crimes, and public disorder.”70 Yet, underpolicing runs well beyond
troubled neighborhoods: there are entire categories of crime and
victimization the police fail to address sufficiently, among them domestic
violence and sexual assault.71
The reasons for underpolicing are varied. Some of this is because of
limited resources. If the police are doing one thing, they cannot be doing
another. “We’ve abandoned the people and the neighborhoods,” lamented
former Dallas Police Chief David Kunkle.72 But it also is because the police
have not proven themselves the most apt at dealing with certain problems,
like sexual assault and domestic violence.73 If the problem is lack of police
capability, it is not clear that insisting the police do more will solve it, as
69 S.F. BUDGET & LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE SAN
FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT 10-11 (2018), https://sfbos.org/sites/default/files/BA_Report_
PA_of_San_Francisco_Police_Department_061218.pdf [https://perma.cc/X94J-UZ53].
70 Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1723.
71 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 5 (1987) (“Rape, battery, sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children, prostitution, and
pornography . . . . These abuses are as allowed de facto as they are prohibited de jure.”); Natapoff,
supra note 14, at 1740 (“Even in the face of stepped-up enforcement, intimate violence against women
remains pervasive . . . .”).
72 Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1726.
73 Victims often report reluctance to go to the police and many report that interacting with the
police is additionally traumatizing. See Rebecca Campbell, Rape Survivors’ Experiences with the Legal
and Medical Systems: Do Rape Victim Advocates Make a Difference?, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
30, 31, 37 (2006) (finding that sexual assault victims frequently report re-traumatization resulting
from police interactions).
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opposed to doing better. For example, many jurisdictions sought to address
domestic violence by adopting mandatory arrest policies, but in some sense
those policies backfired, either because victims became less willing to call the
police for help, or because victims themselves ended up arrested.74
The problem of underpolicing is particularly acute in African-American
neighborhoods, but the perverse irony is that efforts to address this problem
actually may increase the direct coercive harms of policing. People in troubled
communities both need the police for crimefighting reasons, and yet fear
calling them because of the consequences for loved ones.75 Rachel Barkow
explains the conundrum: an aggressive approach to criminogenic “hot spots”
means more policing in neighborhoods of color and more racially disparate
outcomes as a result; less policing “would be a form of discrimination because
victims of colour would get less favourable treatment.”76 Monica Bell vividly
portrays the plight of African-American women who “depend upon police
assistance in times of trouble, crises, and indecision.”77 They call about
domestic violence, they call about out of control youth. They are well aware
that the result may be incarceration of young African-American men, and
so—as Bell documents—they rely on a variety of justifications to explain both
their antipathy for the police and their reliance on them nonetheless.78
*

*

*

The combination of over- and under-protection in affected communities
comes with a final harm, which is the loss of trust in the police, to such a
degree that people stop calling the police, or cooperating with them, and
ultimately take law into their own hands. Numerous scholars have
documented how community members who continually are harassed by, or
74 Alisa Smith, It’s My Decision, Isn’t It? A Research Note on Battered Women’s Perceptions of
Mandatory Intervention Laws, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 1384, 1384 (2000) (finding that some
victims of domestic violence report that mandatory arrest policies would make them less likely to
report a future attack); Meghan A. Novisky & Robert L. Peralta, When Women Tell: Intimate Partner
Violence and the Factors Related to Police Notification, 21 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 65, 65 (2015)
(suggesting that mandatory arrest policies may be deterring reporting among women who do not
support the policy).
75 See Monica C. Bell, Situational Trust: How Disadvantaged Mothers Reconceive Legal Cynicism,
50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 314, 316 (2016) (“Although contacting the police does not usually lead to
arrest, it sometimes does, with unpredictable consequences for intimates and family members.”);
Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization and Law
Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 137, 140 (1997) (“Many in
the African American community must mediate the ‘dual frustration’ of living with problems
associated with illegal drug use and marketing and problems associated with tough drug-law
enforcement.” (footnote omitted)).
76 Rachel E. Barkow, Law Versus Politics, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 138, 150 (2013).
77 Bell, supra note 75, at 315 (quoting ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 63 (1972)).
78 See generally Bell, supra note 75.
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let down by, the police, become alienated from them—and from government
more generally.79 The results are tragic, resulting in a “vicious cycle”—more
like a death spiral—in which alienated communities choose to, or are forced
to, police themselves. Jill Leovy, the vivid chronicler of policing’s failures in
Los Angeles, quotes a gang member who explained that when most people
need help they call the police, but where he lives “[w]e pick up the phone and
call our homeboys.”80 The result often is violence. Paul Ryan, former Speaker
of the House of Representatives, wrote about how he met a man in Detroit,
a shooting victim who refused to tell the police anything about the
perpetrator. Ryan called it a tragedy “that shouldn’t happen in America.” 81 In
truth, it is all too common.
In short, policing is surrounded by, and perpetuates, deep rivers of harm.
Focusing on strategies to reduce stops, searches, force, and arrests is not going
to address chronic social problems, nor alleviate the harms of under-policing.
Achieving real public safety requires a deeper understanding of the role police
play, and how we can alter the response to these harms.
II. DISAGGREGATING THE POLICING FUNCTION
When police are called to the scene they bring with them what they have
been trained to do: deploy force and law. Yet, these are often the wrong
responses to what a situation requires. To achieve real public safety, we need
to dissect what cops actually do during their workday: what problems they
confront and what tools are needed for the task. We need to ask over and over,
what are the police doing here, what are the police doing here, and what are
the police doing here. Section II.A describes the mismatch between how we
have constructed the police, and what we ask them to do. Section II.B then
discusses the many roles a police officer is forced to play, breaking down police
responses into their constituent parts, and asking as to each what skillset or
approach is most likely to yield a positive outcome—to achieve public safety.

79 See e.g., Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE
L.J. 2054, 2072 (2017) (“African Americans, particularly those who are poor or who live in highpoverty or predominately African American communities, tend to have less trust not only in police,
but also in other governmental institutions . . . .”); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and
the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 295 (2003) (“[M]inority group members are less
likely to accept decisions [made by the police] because they feel unfairly treated.”); Corazon R.
Lafuente & Patricia L. Lane, The Lived Experiences of Homeless Men, 12 J. CMTY. HEALTH NURSING
211, 214 (1995) (noting, from interviews with homeless individuals, that “strategies of the homeless
men included staying alone to avoid trouble with the police”).
80 JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 79 (2015).
81 PAUL RYAN, THE WAY FORWARD: RENEWING THE AMERICAN IDEA (2014).
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A. The Mismatch Between the Constructed Cop and the Real Cop
1. The “Constructed” Cop of Force and Law
a. Cops as Crimefighters
Turn on a cop show; what do you see? Cops are crimefighters. They are
bringing the villain to justice, or cracking a big case. They use fast cars and
weapons and cool tech. Or, they might be bumbling and cynical and a bit woe
begotten. Whichever, crime is what cops are about.
This certainly is what our political leaders valorize cops for doing. Here’s
Richard Nixon: “As J. Edgar Hoover often used to tell me, it is our local police
forces who are the real frontline soldiers in the war against crime.”82 Bill Clinton,
looking to pass a crime bill to put 100,000 more police on the street put it
similarly: “This bill puts government on the side of . . . the brave men and
women who put their lives on the line for us every day, not the criminals or those
who would turn away from law enforcement.”83 And that’s how Donald Trump
saw it too: “Every day, our police officers race into darkened allies [sic] and
deserted streets, and onto the doorsteps of the most hardened criminals . . . .”84
Little surprise then, that this is how cops see themselves, touting their
crimefighting role. Ronal Serpas, the former superintendent of the New
Orleans Police Department, wrote: “I became a cop because I care about the
safety of my community and have spent decades on the front lines of
America’s fight against serious and violent crime.”85 So too former NYPD
Commissioner O’Neill: “We never stop trying to drive down crime and quell
disorder; I’m going to do it in lock step with the people we’re dedicated to
protect. It is, after all, what we do now.”86 It’s the reason police complain,
volubly, about the work they are forced to do, as opposed to what they are
supposed to be doing.

Radio Address on Crime and Drug Abuse, PUB. PAPERS 981 (Oct. 15, 1972).
Houston Chronicle, Clinton Signs Crime Bill, Plans Public Forums, SUN-SENTINEL (Sept. 14, 1994),
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1994-09-14-9409130486-story.html [https://perma.cc/5AGT9HJ9].
84 Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., Remarks by President Trump at International
Association of Chiefs of Police (Oct. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/D6SM-UQEE.
85 Ronal Serpas, Former New Orleans Police Supt.: Nation Should Take Louisiana’s Lead on Justice Reform,
ADVOC. (Aug. 28, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/opinion/article_171cfd0eaadb-11e8-b0af-47bd6e7de4e5.html [https://perma.cc/JQK5-Y8Q3].
86 J. David Goodman & Al Baker, William Bratton, New York’s Influential Police Commissioner, Is
Stepping Down, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/nyregion/billbratton-nypd-commissioner.html [https://perma.cc/8LJP-MC6Z].
82
83
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b. Cops as Force
Although for the most part the policing profession is constructed as
crimefighters, cops actually are recruited, trained and equipped to do
something in addition—deploy force. As the sociologist James Q. Wilson put
it long ago, “[t]he patrolman’s role is defined more by his responsibility for
maintaining order than by his responsibility for enforcing the law.”87 Egon
Bittner, one of history’s most apt scholars of policing, referred to “The
Capacity [t]o Use Force” as the “Core [o]f [t]he Police Role.”88
c. Recruiting Cops
Videos and materials used to recruit police officers reinforce this image of
the police as force and law. Police drive in fast cars, or helicopters, firing
weapons, wearing military-like fatigues—whether fighting crime or
otherwise.89 To be sure, some jurisdictions stress the service function,
depicting cops surrounded by smiling community members.90 But police
recruiting materials frequently display the virtues of soldier-like discipline,
and the mission of using force to keep the community safe.91
d. Training Cops
Police training is where the rubber meets the road; it constructs the cop.
The training police cadets receive confirms that deploying force and
enforcing the law are what we expect out of cops.
Police training varies state to state and department to department. The
curriculum at the state level typically is set by something like a Police Officer
87 WILSON, supra note 16, at 16; see also REISS, supra note 77, at 17 (“Though superficially their
role is to preserve the peace by coping with any individuals in the large aggregation who violate
laws, they must be prepared to restore order as well.”).
88 BITTNER, supra note 9, at 36.
89 See Radley Balko, The Disturbing Message in Police Recruiting Videos, WASH. POST (Apr. 16,
2014, 5:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/16/the-disturbingmessages-in-police-recruiting-videos [https://perma.cc/6TQQ-BS4M] (collecting examples of police
recruiting videos demonstrating a “general move toward more aggressive, militarized police forces”).
90 Join Calaveras CSO, Deputy Sheriff Jobs in California | Calaveras County Law Enforcement
Careers, YOUTUBE (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DKa7pgTsJ_0 [https://
perma.cc/3HZT-XHRE].
91 Cf. Balko, supra note 89 (“Note, too, what’s missing from the recruiting video: Public service.
Cops walking beats. Community policing. Helping people.”). In the aftermath of the George Floyd
killing, a journalist in Kentucky contacted me about contrasting recruiting videos for Louisville
(militarized) and Lexington (more public interest-oriented). Since that coverage, Louisville has
taken down its video. Andrew Wolfson, Louisville Police Recruiting Video Lures A
‘ ction-Movie Heroes,’
Not Guardians, Experts Say, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Jan. 22, 2021, 8:53 PM) https://amp.courierjournal.com/amp/5390736002 [https://perma.cc/9QDX-DFN4] (noting that the Louisville Metro
Police Department took down a recruitment video that “portray[ed] police as warriors rather than
public servants”).
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Standards and Training (POST) board.92 These requirements are minima;
departments often demand that their officers exceed POST requirements.93
Pre-service training is not, of course, all the training officers receive. Before
being left on the street on their own, most departments place new officers in
some sort of field training.94 It’s commonly said that field training officers
(FTOs) are prone to tell recruits “forget all that stuff they just taught you, this
is how it is really done.”95 Then there are in-service training requirements, as
well as opportunities for additional training that arise from time to time,
whether it is to be a detective or participate on a tactical (e.g., SWAT) team.96
Still, recruit training says a lot about how we “construct” cops. Most cops
take the streets with only this training, plus whatever field training they get.
It’s hardly encouraging to hear that FTOs might suggest the initial training
should be ignored: whatever happens afterward is then necessarily
idiosyncratic, the product of what an individual FTO tells an individual
cadet. All of us learn on the job, but POSTs and department requirements
lay out what they believe police need to know.
With help from a number of cooperative agencies, some law students and
I obtained the training curricula for POSTs and some of the country’s
departments. We broke the course requirements into five categories: use of
force, training in law, mediation and social work, emergent non-law
enforcement instruction (things like medical skills), and basic workplace skills
(interviewing, report writing; the administrative know-how of a department).
Those training materials reveal something altogether telling. This graphic
shows a not-atypical breakdown of police training at the POST and
department level, from Nashville and from Tennessee.97 The Tennessee

92 See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2013, at 8 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5Y7-FMPZ] [hereinafter REAVES, ACADEMIES 2013] (stating that ninety-three
percent of all police academies “developed content for their basic training program in response to
mandates from a state POST or other state-level agency or commission”).
93 See infra Appendix A (comparing Tennessee POST and department requirements).
94 See REAVES, ACADEMIES 2013, supra note 92, at 4 (reporting that more than ninety percent
of police academies include a mandatory field training program).
95 See Raymond E. Foster, Forget Everything You Learned in the Academy, POLICE WRITERS,
http://www.police-writers.com/articles/forget_everything_you_learned_in_the_academy.html
[https://perma.cc/R59L-M3MJ] (lamenting the fact that “[n]early every new cop has heard a field
training officer or senior partner utter the phrase, ‘Forget everything you learned in the academy.’”).
96 See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2006, at 1 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9BQS-ARD4] [hereinafter REAVES, ACADEMIES 2006] (“87% of [police]
academies provided in-service training for active-duty officers and for officers in specialized units
such as K-9 or special weapons and tactics (SWAT) units.”).
97 In Appendix A you can see a full breakdown of the Nashville, Tennessee training regime and
the set of POST requirements for the State of Tennessee.

948

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 925

POST requires 480 hours of training for new officers, but Nashville requires
considerably more.
Figure 1: Nashville Training Breakdown

What is glaringly obvious is that officers are trained primarily on how to
use force and engage in law enforcement. There’s also, as with any job, a big
dollop of basic policing administrative protocol. Where they get the least
training by far is in the categories of mediation and social work, and in dealing
with non-law enforcement emergent situations.
e. Equipping Cops
Finally, we equip our police to enforce the law and use force as well. They
are outfitted with a variety of weapons.98 They have handcuffs to take people
into custody. They carry summons books.
That equipment doesn’t tell us everything, of course. It’s not clear any
tools are needed if mediating disputes is the primary police function; you just
need training, a brain, and a mouth. Still, what we give them says a lot about
who they are.
2. The Actual Cop
The problem being, this image of cops primarily as crimefighters is not
really true. Not remotely.

98 Carly Garcia, Police Equipment: Contents of a Utility Belt, W. VA. ST. UNIV. (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://online.wvstateu.edu/news/criminal-justice/police-equipment-police-duty-belt
[https://perma.cc/RX7M-4ZXQ] (stating that police officers often carry knives, tasers, mace, batons,
and guns).
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Several decades ago, social scientists—particularly sociologists—became
interested in the question of whether cops really were the crimefighters they
were touted as being. Researchers looked through duty logs and dispatch
records, went on ride-alongs in police cars, made lists, and kept count.99 This
decades-long project had a serious shortcoming: scholars often “collapse[d]
the activities conducted into fewer general categories.”100 Still, what we did
learn about policing is eye-opening.
Cops do remarkably little crime-fighting. “A major theme of the earliest
studies concerning urban officer workload involved dispelling the popular
myth that police spend most of their time protecting the ‘thin blue line’
between law and order.”101 In Baltimore, in 1999, “the most violent, the most
addicted and the most abandoned city in [A]merica,” according to thenMayor Martin O’Malley, regular patrol officers spent about eleven percent of
their time dealing with crime.102 Even that was split about fifty-fifty between
serious crime and things like disorderly conduct, drug possession,
drunkenness, and loitering.103 In smaller places the volume of time spent on
crime, defined comprehensively, can be way lower: 0.7 to 2.2% of a cop’s
shift.104 A more recent report on activity in three jurisdictions in the Hudson
Valley showed that 0.55% of calls to police addressed in the highest violent
99 See, e.g., Theresa Ervin Conover & John Liederbach, Policing on Demand: An Observational
Study of Mobilization and Citizen Encounters Across Communities, 17 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT.
170, 171 (2015) (utilizing direct systematic social observation of officers to compare police behavior
between communities); Christine N. Famega, Proactive Policing by Post and Community Officers, 55
CRIME & DELINQ. 78, 86 (2009) [hereinafter Famega, Proactive Policing] (using notes collected by
trained observers who accompanied officers during their shifts and recorded their behavior); Brian
K. Payne, Bruce L. Berg & Ivan Y. Sun, Policing in Small Town America: Dogs, Drunks, Disorder, and
Dysfunction, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 31, 34, 38 (2005) (analyzing two years of cases in a small-town crime
reporter to understand what residents thought required law enforcement action); Christine N.
Famega, Variation in Officer Downtime: A Review of the Research, 28 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 388, 390 (2005) (reviewing dispatch records and conducting field
observations of police officers on patrol); John Liederbach, Addressing the “Elephant in the Living
Room”: An Observational Study of the Work of Suburban Police, 28 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 415, 419 (2005) (conducting direct observations of interactions between
police officers and citizens, among other patrol activities); John Liederbach & James Frank, Policing
Mayberry: The Work Routines of Small-Town and Rural Officers, 28 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 53, 59-60 (2003)
(analyzing over one thousand hours of observation data of small-town and rural officers); Brad W.
Smith, Kenneth J. Novak & James Frank, Community Policing and the Work Routines of Street-Level
Officers, 26 CRIM. JUST. REV. 17, 22-23 (2001) (using systematic social observation to understand the
activities of community police officers during their normal workdays).
100 Famega, Proactive Policing, supra note 99, at 85.
101 Liederbach, supra note 99, at 417 (citations omitted).
102 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, O’Malley’s Claim About Crime Rates in Baltimore, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015,
3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/04/28/omalleys-claim-about-crimerates-in-baltimore [https://perma.cc/8ARD-TG59]; Famega, Proactive Policing, supra note 99, at 92.
103 See Famega, Proactive Policing, supra note 99, at 91 tbl.2.
104 Liederbach & Frank, supra note 99, at 63 tbl.1; see also Smith et al., supra note 99, at 26 tbl.1 (finding
that officers spent a majority of their time performing motorized patrols and administrative duties).
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crime jurisdiction of the three; the highest on overall crime was 7.2%, most
of that being property crime.105 A number of news articles in the course of
protests in the spring of 2020 underscored the conclusions of these earlier
studies; relying on an analysis of data from calls for service, journalists
showed how very little of what cops are called to do is respond to crime,
particularly violent crime.106
Much of many cops’ time is unproductive altogether. When not filling out
reports or taking personal time, a lot of an officer’s working time—easily
upwards of thirty percent—is spent on patrol.107 In most places, this is
motorized patrol.108 This itself is remarkable, because it’s long been accepted
that not much is accomplished by random motorized patrol.109
While on patrol, cops run from one “call for service” to another (i.e.,
dispatched to respond to 911 calls), often dealing with minor disturbances.110
There’s a lot of time spent on traffic and motor vehicle issues, on false burglar
alarms, on noise complaints, and on problems with animals.111 Rural and small
town officers “perform[] a wide-array of tasks not commonly associated with

105 HUDSON VALLEY PATTERN FOR PROGRESS, POLICE SERVICES STUDY: CITY OF
BEACON, TOWN OF FISHKILL, VILLAGE OF FISHKILL 28 (2015).
106 See Joel Rubin & Ben Poston, LAPD Responds to a Million 911 Calls a Year, but Relatively Few
for Violent Crimes, L.A. TIMES (July 5, 2020, 9:47 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/202007-05/lapd-911-calls-reimagining-police [https://perma.cc/AG4U-SM9G] (finding that less than eight
percent of calls were for violent crime; most were for traffic accidents and “minor disturbances”);
Thomas Breen, 95.6% of Cops’ Calls Don’t Involve Violence, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (June 19, 2020, 3:56
PM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/police_dispatch_stats [https://
perma.cc/T445-9UT4] (reporting that fewer than 4.4% of dispatches were for “assault, gunfire, robbery,
rape, stabbing, murder, or person shot”).
107 See Liederbach, supra note 99, at 424 tbl.II (finding that between 24.2 and 42.8% of officers’
time was spent on motor patrol); Liederbach & Frank, supra note 99, at 63 tbl.1 (finding that, on
average, officers in five Ohio towns spent 36.9% of their time on motor patrol).
108 See Conover & Liederbach, supra note 99, at 171 (noting that motorized patrol was a core
activity for most study sites); Liederbach, supra note 99, at 424 tbl.II (finding that police in certain
Cincinnati suburbs spend between 24.2 and 42.8% of their shifts on motorized patrol); Smith et al.,
supra note 99, at 26 tbl.1 (observing that Cincinnati police officers spent an average of 26% of their
shifts on motorized patrol).
109 See GEORGE L. KELLING, TONY PATE, DUANE DIECKMAN & CHARLES E. BROWN,
POLICE FOUND., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTATIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT vii (1974)
(“[R]outine preventive patrol in marked police cars has little value in preventing crime or making
citizens feel safe.”); see also Barry Friedman & Elizabeth G. Janszky, Policing’s Information Problem 8
& n.31 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 19-39,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3452242 (“[A]lthough the methodology
of the Kansas City experiment has been the subject of sharp challenge, its results generally are taken
as correct . . . .”).
110 See Payne et al., supra note 99, at 32 (summarizing other research indicating that officers
spend a significant amount of their time “dealing with minor disturbances and service calls”).
111 See, e.g., Conover & Liederbach, supra note 99, at 176 tbl.3 (reporting that between 11.54 and
54.17% of Cincinnati police departments’ time was spent on traffic issues); Payne et al., supra note
99, at 34 (“The most common single type of case described in the police report involved animals.”).

2021]

Disaggregating the Policing Function

951

the work of urban police, including situations involving utility problems,
performing house checks for citizens on vacation, and clearing cows blocking
vehicular traffic.”112
Below is some data from a study of suburban policing in Hamilton
County, Ohio between April 1999 and May 2000. The data was collected by
systematic social observation (SSO) of officers in fourteen agencies.113 There
were over 3,500 hours of observation, or the equivalent of 442 eight-hour
shifts. The agencies worked in communities that varied widely in socioeconomic, land use, and racial demographics. The communities ranged from
working class urbanized, to a variety of middle-income residential, to a couple
exclusive upper-income communities. The white population in the
communities ran from 36.1 to 98.2%. Median income was from just over
$28,000 to just over $95,500. In terms of land use, the range was from 38–97%
residential. A real mix.
In the original study the data were collapsed into some sixteen categories
and five primary functions: motorized patrol, administrative tasks (mostly
report writing), personal, travel, and traffic enforcement. But here, it is
reverse engineered to display the type and frequency of problems with which
the police dealt. In the data there were 1,250 specific problem types resulting
from dispatched calls.

112
113

Liederbach, supra note 99, at 419.
Id.
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This is the list of problems that had a frequency in double digits:
Table 1: Frequency of Police Problems

Type of Problem
Disabled vehicle
Traffic accident, property damage only
Domestic argument
Alarm (not fire)
Medical assistance
Meet complainant
Animal problem
Traffic accident
Emergency—nature unspecified
Discovery of missing or stolen property
Domestic fight
Vehicle violation
Warrant to be served
Harassment/stalking
Traffic accident, personal injury
Theft from commercial
Juvenile problem/disturbance
Moving violation
General request for service
Suspicious person
Suspicious circumstance
Shoplifting
Leaving the scene (property damage)
Fight (physical)
Family trouble
Noise disturbance
Motor vehicle theft
Theft from motor vehicle
Driving under the influence
Disorderly
Theft from residence
Parking violation
Excess speed

Frequency
108
77
65
57
57
28
26
24
22
20
20
18
18
17
17
16
16
15
15
14
14
14
14
13
12
11
11
11
11
10
10
10
10

As one can see, these data readily confirm the general story that crimefighting is a small amount of what policing involves for most officers. Things
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like robbery, attempted rape, and weapons issues all had a frequency of “1.”
One has to run pretty far down the list to get to most serious crimes.
Equally instructive are the offenses for which there was some sort of
charge. Out of the 3,330 face-to-face encounters, there were some 885 charges.
Here are the offenses for which there were five or more charges:
Table 2: Charges
Type of Offense Charge
Exceeding speed limit
Exceeding speed limit—infraction
Other traffic regulation—infraction
Motor vehicle equipment violations
Other traffic regulation
Registration, license plate, driver’s license
Traffic infraction
Registration, license plate, driver’s license—
infraction
Exceeding speed limit—misdemeanor
Domestic violence—misdemeanor
Traffic
Operating a vehicle while intoxicated
Other traffic regulation—misdemeanor
Disorderly conduct—misdemeanor
Traffic—misdemeanor
Possession of narcotic, dangerous drug, look-alike
substance, or marijuana
Registration, license plate, driver’s license—
misdemeanor
Operating a vehicle while intoxicated misdemeanor
Assault and related offenses—misdemeanor
Theft and conversion—misdemeanor
Alcoholic beverage offenses
Possession of narcotic, dangerous drug, look-alike
substance, or marijuana—felony
Criminal trespass—misdemeanor
Theft and conversion
Offenses against public order—inducing panic
Other traffic regulation—unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle

Frequency of Offense Charge
141
129
91
47
42
35
33
32
24
17
15
15
14
13
10
9
8
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
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Again, the vast majority of these are traffic violations. Trailing those are
domestic violence misdemeanors, disorderly conduct misdemeanors, and a
variety of narcotics issues, mostly around possession. There are very few
felonies of any sort.
In short, most of what cops do is not crime fighting, even though that is
primarily what they train for. That doesn’t mean force and law lack value—
we’ll get to that in a moment. It just means there’s a mismatch between what
we intend cops to do and what they actually do.
To be clear, times change. Just as these studies were concluding, police in
some urban areas turned to the sorts of “proactive” tactics that may well
indicate higher numbers of enforcement actions, and perhaps around more
serious crime.114 We’ll take a look at this switch to proactive policing in just a
bit, disaggregating it along with everything else. Yet, in many places in
America—in fact in most neighborhoods in cities—policing still likely looks
very much like what you see above. A lot of varied tasks, not so many of them
fighting crime.
B. Disaggregating the Policing Function
If the goal is to reduce harm, and improve outcomes in police encounters,
it is not enough simply to identify the broad sorts of problems cops confront
daily. We then need to ask what dealing with those types of problems entails
exactly. To consider what a cop actually is doing in any situation—what precise
function are they serving? To think about what skill set is needed, and
whether someone other than a police officer, with different skills, might
address the problem better.
1. The First Responder
Although the police like to conceive of themselves primarily as crime
fighters, what they are called upon most often to be are first responders. As
Albert Reiss put it some time ago: “Police regard it as their duty to find
criminals and prevent or solve crimes. The public considers it the duty of the
police to respond to its calls and crises . . . .”115 Indeed, it often is explained
that the police are society’s only 24-hour general purpose responder.116

See infra notes 218–21 and accompanying text.
REISS, supra note 77, at 70.
CHARLES W. DEAN ET AL., SOCIAL WORK AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERSHIPS:
A SUMMONS TO THE VILLAGE 12 (2000); Tommy Landau, Policing and Security in Four Remote
Aboriginal Communities: A Challenge to Coercive Models of Police Work, 38 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY
1, 5 (1996); Sylvester Amara Lamin & Consoler Teboh, Police Social Work and Community Policing,
COGENT SOC. SCI., July 25, 2016, at 1, 9.
114
115
116
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Cops respond frequently to calls from poorer neighborhoods—and as a
result from communities of color or marginalized communities. Calls come
because the problems people face in those communities are more acute, and
because the residents often lack the capacity or resources to deal with the
problems in other ways.117 They have less access to the sort of professionals
that can help middle- and upper-income folks: doctors, clergy, and mental
health professionals.118 Lower income individuals “use the police more as
troubleshooters in the case of interpersonal conflicts.”119 The tragedy, as we’ve
seen, is that where cops go, law and force follow. Thus, more calls may lead to
more enforcement without the underlying problems necessarily being solved.
The entire notion of the police as society’s emergency first responders
because they are the only ones available 24/7 is problematic. Police aren’t
actually the only 24-hour responder: we don’t call upon the police to put out
fires or respond to a heart attack.120 Just as there are firefighters and EMS,
presumably there could be other sorts of rapid responders on call around the
clock to deal with, say, substance abuse. Calls don’t always come at night: if
some other responder is more appropriate during the day, that is who should
come. And, in fact, cops often arrive after the emergency is over. Calls get
stacked up, so much so that the response hardly is always rapid.121

117 See BITTNER, supra note 9, at 43 (explaining that non-enforcement police work “consist[s] of
addressing situations in which people simply do not seem to be able to manage their own lives adequately”).
118 See Landau, supra note 116, at 6 (noting this phenomenon); Elaine Cumming, Ian Cumming
& Laura Edell, Policeman as Philosopher, Guide and Friend, 12 SOC. PROBS. 276, 285 (1965) (“[P]oor,
uneducated people appear to use the police in the way that middle-class people use family doctors
and clergymen—that is, as the first port of call in time of trouble.”).
119 CLIFFORD D. SHEARING, CTR. OF CRIMINOLOGY, UNIV. OF TORONTO, DIAL-A-COP:
A STUDY OF POLICE MOBILISATION 60 (1984); see also Bell, supra note 75, at 329 (“Police are
deemed fairly efficacious in escorting away violent partners, finding runaway children, or quieting
disruptive neighbors.”).
120 Cf. Landau, supra note 116, at 5 (“Conceptually, this [fact that police departments are open
24-hours a day] does not place them apart from all-night gas stations or diners.”).
121 See, e.g., Natapoff, supra note 14, at 1723 (describing “slow or nonexistent 911 responses” as
one form of “urban underenforcement”); Complaint at 1, Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass’n v City
of Chicago, No. 11CH37299 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 2013), available at https://www.acluil.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB9F-B5JT] (alleging
that the City of Chicago’s method of deploying police services “utilizes criteria that result in a
greater frequency of delays in dispatching police officers to respond to 911 calls for service in
neighborhoods that are predominantly African American and Hispanic . . . than in predominantly
white neighborhoods”); Angus Loten, 911 Response Times Are Getting Faster Thanks to Data Integration,
WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2019, 7:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/911-response-times-are-gettingfaster-thanks-to-data-integration-11560468747 [https://perma.cc/WBJ9-JHPR] (“[911] [r]esponse
times vary widely by location and the severity of the emergency.”); Editorial, Slow Dallas Police
Response Times Hurt Community Support, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/2019/02/05/slow-dallas-police-response-times-hurtcommunity-support/ [https://perma.cc/6EMF-LDER] (taking note of delayed response times and
explaining “how quickly an officer arrives shapes [residents’] confidence.”).
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In any event, “first responder” does not necessarily mean responding to
calls that require force and law. Just because the police are the first responder
does not mean they are the right responder. As we saw above, people call the
police for a wide range of problems: vehicle problems, noise complaints,
animal problems, medical assistance, lost belongings, fights, disabled vehicles,
and alcohol-driven problems. Some, such as theft, violence, and sexual
attacks, plainly are law enforcement issues—though even here, as we are about
to see, the appropriate skill set requires yet finer parsing than simply to say
“crimefighter.” And others may require the presence of force, though that
force perhaps should be at the background. But many do not require force or
law, and most require very different skills either in addition or altogether.
2. The Purveyors of Force and Law
Even the idea of the “police of force and law” needs to be disaggregated,
however. The two need not necessarily travel hand in hand. One may be
required at times, but not the other. And we undoubtedly overuse both.
a. The Use of Force
Long ago, sociologists studying the police came to the realization that
force (and not law) is the primary reason we call upon the police.122 Society
requires order, and the police provide it.123 No one recognized this point more
clearly than Egon Bittner, who repeatedly emphasized that “the police are
nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified
force in society.”124 This, he explained, is what “lends homogeneity” to the
raft of very different activities we call upon the police to perform, such as
“catching a criminal, driving the mayor to the airport, evicting a drunken
person from a bar, directing traffic, crowd control,” and much more.125
The fact that force, and not law, is our primary use of the police is evident
from the many situations in which criminal law is deployed, but we’d never
consider the police necessary; or where law is violated, but the police ignore
it altogether and we think this entirely appropriate. As to the first, we use the
criminal law against tax evaders and securities fraud, but no one thinks to call
122 See BITTNER, supra note 9, at 40; (“[E]very conceivable police intervention projects the
message that force may be, and may have to be, used to achieve a desired objective.”); Megan
Quattlebaum & Tom Tyler, Beyond the Law: An Agenda for Policing Reform, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1017,
1026 (2020) (“It remains the case that police officers are generalists, primarily trained in and capable
of deploying a variety of levels of force.”).
123 See WILSON, supra note 16, at 31 (“Police officers were originally ‘watchmen’ whose task it
was to walk their rounds and maintain order in the streets.”); REISS, supra note 77, at 17 (arguing
that the police role is to “preserve the peace” and they “must be prepared to restore order”).
124 BITTNER, supra note 9, at 39.
125 Id. at 44.
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the police—because there is no need for force. As to the second, except when
the government is using a “zero tolerance” approach, the police do not walk
down the street, like codes enforcers, ticketing people for every single
violation they see.126
We call upon the police not only when force actually is needed, but when
it may be. Bittner deemed this a point of “extraordinary importance.”127 If a
situation could turn ugly, we need the cops nearby, even though ultimately it
may not. Once, at a convening on police reform I attended, someone was
being derisive about the police being called to deal with noise from a party.
The point being made was that it was “just noise,” some people were having
fun, why did that require the police to show up or get involved? But as Bittner
pointed out, “it is not the volume of the noise that creates hazards for life,
limb, property, and the public order, but that the people involved say and
otherwise show that the problem has reached a critical stage in which
something-had-better-be-done-about-it.”128
Still, our goal should be to minimize the situations in which force is used.
Force has a dehumanizing and traumatic impact on people against whom it is
used.129 Although the presence of force has the potential to calm things down
and bring order, at times the use of force, or even its presence, can be
downright counterproductive. For those who are suffering from cognitive
difficulties, for example, even the inkling of force can exacerbate a situation.130
For this reason, at least our formal preference is for less use of force, not
more. Police are taught in various ways about a force continuum, in which
126 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 98-120 (1975) (describing how
discretion at the officer level leads to differences in the enforcement of rules and policy and
advocating for a formalized system of rules and rule creation); Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police
Rulemaking, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2019) (“Officers decide where to patrol and whom to stop,
whether to issue a warning for a broken taillight or write a ticket, and whether to throw a joint in
the gutter, issue a summons, or make an arrest.”).
127 Egon Bittner, Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police, in THE
POTENTIAL FOR REFORM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34-35 (Herbert Jacob ed., 1974).
128 Id. at 32.
129 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“It is important
to recognize the human toll of unconstitutional stops. . . . [E]ach stop is . . . a demeaning and
humiliating experience. No one should live in fear of being stopped whenever he leaves his home to
go about the activities of daily life.”).
130 See Amy C. Watson & Anjali J. Fulambarker, The Crisis Intervention Team Model of Police
Response to Mental Health Crises: A Primer for Mental Health Practitioners, 8 BEST PRACS. MENTAL
HEALTH 71, 77 (2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3769782/pdf [https://
perma.cc/RA3F-5V3U] (“[Mental health] [p]roviders felt that police officers lacked understanding
of mental illness and would often exacerbate crisis situations.”); Erica Goode, For Police, a Playbook
for Conflicts Involving Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/04/26/health/police-mental-illness-crisis-intervention.html [https://perma.cc/G2B968WE] (“[R]outine police actions aimed at control—placing a hand on a person’s shoulder, for
example—can backfire with someone with a severe mental illness.”).
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they are to use no more force than necessary to accomplish necessary aims.131
When force is used, the police must report it; the more serious the force, the
more elaborate the reporting and investigation.132
To be fair, while it is easy to speak of minimizing force, it is not a simple
proposition. The people the police encounter on the street daily frequently
are troubled, recalcitrant, uncooperative, in need of aid or disturbing others,
and yet unwilling to be helped.133 Sometimes we ask of the police superhuman
patience and control.
Yet, given the import of the use of force by the state, and the fact that
force often is a prelude to law, we need to think about how to use force more
judiciously, and how to design first response to ensure this happens.
First, if the use of force may be required, but not necessarily is, then
perhaps force ought to remain in the background. The very point of being the
“or else” of society is that other options often should be explored first.
Consider again the list of problems encountered in the Cincinnati suburbs.
One of the most frequent—not uncommonly so—was “domestic argument.”
Domestic arguments can turn very serious—for the cop or the participants—
in the blink of an eye, with disastrous consequences.134 We may well want
force on the scene. But might we get further in the long run if someone with
other skills—in social work or mediation—actually handled the incident?
131 See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211,
211 (2017) (“[M]any agencies train officers to respond to threats according to a force ‘continuum’ that
does not provide hard-edged rules for when or how police can use force or deadly force.”); The Useof-Force Continuum, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Aug. 3, 2009), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/use-forcecontinuum [https://perma.cc/AL7G-2VXY] (providing an example of a use-of-force continuum).
132 See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 131, at 286 (“[W]hile the vast majority [of police
agencies] make clear in written policies that supervisory review of uses of force and reporting of
uses of force is mandatory, the policies do differ on the categories of force that must be reported,
and on what procedures are followed next.”).
133 See DEAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 17 (“Officers must deal with individuals who are not
just mentally ill but also abuse alcohol and participate in illegal drug activity. They are often
homeless, resistant to treatment, violent and aggressive and likely to resist officers’ actions because
they view these actions as unfair and their cooperation is involuntary.”).
134 See Janet M. Blair, Katherine A. Fowler, Carter J. Betz & Jason L. Baumgardner,
Occupational Homicides of Law Enforcement Officers, 2003–2013, 51 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. S188,
S191 (2016) (finding that, between 2003 and 2013, 14.1% of law enforcement officer homicides in the
United States were in the course of responding to a domestic disturbance); Emiko Petrosky, Janet
M. Blair, Carter J. Betz, Katherine A. Fowler, Shane P.D. Jack & Bridget H. Lyons, Racial and Ethnic
Differences in Homicides of Adult Women and the Role of Intimate Partner Violence—United States, 20032014, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 741, 745 (2017) (finding that over half of all
female homicides are intimate-partner violence-related, and that in nearly one third of those cases,
an argument immediately preceded homicide); Jamiles Lartey, Police Officers Most Likely to Die
Responding to Domestic Disputes, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/31/police-officer-fatalies-department-of-justice-report
[https://perma.cc/P4UX-D6G2] (reporting on a DOJ investigation finding that from 2010 to 2014,
more officers were killed responding to domestic disturbances than to any other type of call).
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There are plenty of situations, such as a noise complaint or a call about a
mentally troubled person, in which another problem solver with a different tool
might come to a more effective resolution, and without ever needing force. The
point frequently can get lost when the only responder present is a cop.
Second, and related, we should calibrate the presence of force (and law)
to the situation. In the domestic disturbance situation, we might want the
presence of force standing side-by-side with another skill set such as
mediation. Mediation tries to resolve the situation; the presence of force (and
law) conveys the message that if mediation fails, “or else” is the alternative.
But in other situations, such as in calls about the mentally ill, we may need
force on the scene but entirely out of the immediate frame, so as not to
exacerbate the situation.
Finally, we need to do a better job of deciding whether any given situation
ultimately justifies the use of force. Force is used not only to calm situations,
but to obtain compliance. Compliance with what, though? Although we want
people to comply with lawful demands, sometimes it may be better to walk
away and rethink the approach entirely, which is not always the judgment if
force and law are out front. Police come to expect absolute compliance, but
the commands of the police must be judicious, and the use of force must
match the gravity of the situation. Deadly force was used on Eric Garner
either for selling “loosies” on the street, or—as is often the case—for failing
to adhere to the commands of officers who were determined to arrest him for
it.135 But did the underlying set of facts justify the state’s escalating response?
Was there some other way to tackle the problem besides arresting Garner
with force? It is fair to ask in every exercise of the use of force whether the
imposition was necessary, and worth it.
b. Enforcing the Law
As we’ve seen, law enforcement is a relatively small part of what police do
every day.136 But rather than thinking they should do more, in truth they
probably should do less. Enforcement, after all, is not a net plus for society,

135 Ashely Southall, Police Investigators Determined Officer Choked Eric Garner, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/nyregion/eric-garner-death-daniel-pantaleo-trialchokehold.html [https://perma.cc/FDC6-3GAB].
136 See Jack R. Greene & Carl B. Klockars, What Police Do, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE:
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 273, 275 (Carl B. Klockars & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1991)
(summarizing police workload studies that found that crimefighting accounts for a small proportion
of police work); see also supra text accompanying note 102 (discussing the small percentage that
crimefighting plays in a police officer’s daily schedule, through the example of Baltimore).
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it is a minus. A well-functioning society deters or otherwise reduces the need
for the law to intervene.137
When it comes to policing, the law enforcement power of the officer often
is simply the excuse for having force present, or for using it. Because force
without a legal basis is thuggery, the ultimate mandate to enforce the law is
what gives the use of force by the police its legitimacy.138 This is so even
though force can solve many problems in which law proves utterly
unnecessary, such as when police break up a fight but charge no one.
Restoring order may require some force, even handcuffing, but law need not
follow. Even when the ultimate result is an arrest, that too may simply be a
legal veneer for what was believed necessary by the police to bring the
situation under control.
By the same token, as noted above, law can be brought to bear without
force anywhere nearby. In many jurisdictions, parking tickets—legal
summons—are handed out by people who have no tools with which to impose
force.139 Summons also often are issued for moving violations, or even for
low-level misdemeanors such as drinking or smoking marijuana in public, and
served with no force necessary.140 Sometimes we get legal summons in the
mail after a camera snapped a picture of us violating the law, such as from a
red-light camera.141
The question that needs to be asked much more frequently than we do is
whether utilizing the law in particular circumstances achieves the aims of public
safety, and whether it does so in a productive or counterproductive way.142
Police hand out criminal summons and or arrest people in many
circumstances in which it is doubtful either that there is the sort of culpability
137 See Friedman & Janszky, supra note 109 (examining the lack of benefit-cost analysis in
policing); id. at 6-7, 40-61 (discussing the current level of optimality regarding policing in the United
States and suggesting possible remedies to the situation).
138 Cf. Bittner, supra note 127, at 36 (“It is not that policemen are entitled to use force because
they must deal with nasty criminals. Instead, the duty of handling nasty criminals devolves on them
because they have the more general authority to use force as needed to bring about desired objectives.”).
139 See Christine Hauser, The Traffic Agents’ Lament: Uniforms, but Little Respect, N.Y. TIMES (July
25, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/nyregion/25traffic.html [https://perma.cc/5HP2EMDF] (noting that traffic cops in New York City are civilian employees of the New York Police
Department and do not carry guns).
140 See Ashley Southall, Summonses, Not Arrests, for Small Crimes in Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/nyregion/summonses-not-arrests-for-smallcrimes-in-manhattan.html [https://perma.cc/5BVL-9STH] (reporting on the New York Police
Department’s use of summonses for low-level offenses).
141 See Joe Sharkey, The Collision over Traffic Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/business/05road.html [https://perma.cc/XJ2K-KSHL] (describing
people “who one day open the mail and see their face on a ticket, say for a red-light violation they had
no idea they committed, in a place they drove through months ago”).
142 See generally Friedman & Janszky, supra note 109 (examining the lack of benefit-cost
analysis in policing).
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that typically justifies the criminal law, or that utilizing the criminal law will
avoid the underlying harm. As we saw in Part I, we impose legal sanctions
regularly against the mentally ill, or the homeless, and little changes. Not only
may these individuals be lacking in culpability, but they also may not have the
capability to take responsibility for the situation that brought the police there.
Even with something as simple as a ticket for driving with a headlight
out, what precisely are we accomplishing by invoking enforcement
mechanisms? Lights are mechanical devices; burning out is what they do.
Sometimes they go out and we do not know—later model cars may inform us
about the problem; older cars (driven typically by less-well-off folks) may
not. And when the lights go out, there may not be a vendor immediately
available to remedy the situation. Why do we even think imposing criminal
sanctions is the right answer to problems such as these? Deterrence is dubious
in many circumstances as well. Drivers are not trained to walk around their
cars conducting safety checks like airline pilots on their aircraft.
Think also of public urination, a frequently charged misdemeanor.143 It’s
one thing, perhaps, when a bunch of rowdy, drunken college students decide
the street is a more convenient urinal than finding a bathroom. It’s quite
another when people live on the street—or even are tourists—and we don’t
provide public facilities to meet their basic human needs.144 People need to
pee, and not all circumstances in which they do so are deterrable or culpable.
Calling law, and having law show up, triggers a host of trouble that as a
society we would best avoid if the underlying problems could be dealt with
differently. Bringing criminal charges creates a “record” that people often
cannot come out from under.145 It affects the lives of the defendants and their
ability to earn a living, both for themselves individually and for their
dependents.146 Why use this awesome and harm-inducing tool if there is
143 See Matt Flegenheimer & J. David Goodman, Public Urination in New York Becomes Test Case
for Policing, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/nyregion/publicurination-in-new-york-becomes-test-case-for-policing.html [https://perma.cc/LVQ6-L2ZJ] (reporting
that 28,609 people were cited for public urination in 2014 in New York City).
144 See Daniel Denvir, Peeing Is Not a Crime, CITYLAB (July 21, 2015, 3:20 PM),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/07/peeing-is-not-a-crime/399068/ [https://perma.cc/RM2TDP5M] (“Citing people for public urination criminalizes someone for doing something that society,
the state and the market effectively encourages by making public restrooms scarce.”).
145 See James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 387, 387 (2006) (“The more people who are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and
especially incarcerated, the larger is the criminally stigmatized underclass screened out of legitimate
opportunities, steered toward criminal careers and further incarceration.” (footnote omitted));
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOCIO. 937, 937 (2003) (“A criminal record
presents a major barrier to employment, with important implications for racial disparities.”).
146 See REBECCA VALLAS, MELISSA BOTEACH, RACHEL WEST & JACKIE ODUM, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS, REMOVING BARRIERS TO OPPORTUNITY FOR PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS AND THEIR CHILDREN 3-14 (2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/
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another way to get from A to Z, to make sure automobile taillights are lit, and
people are not urinating all over the place?
In addition, the mere availability of legal sanctions grants police officers
enormous discretion, and all too often that discretion is misused.147 That, after
all, is the nature of discretion. William Bratton has said that police use the law
to “control behavior,” treating the law “as a proxy for the behavioral standards
that legislatures have agreed upon and judges have upheld.”148 This radically
overstates things. Legislatures criminalize conduct by the bucketful, and hardly
expect each violation will result in legal sanction.149 Such overcriminalization
allows cops to pick and choose when they will bring the law to bear.150 Yet, how
sensitive and fine-tuned is each individual cop to knowing in each circumstance
when law enforcement is appropriate and when it is not? At the least, the
application of law can be highly idiosyncratic.151 We know all too well it is also
deeply biased, particularly against people of color and poorer people.152
Finally, and ironically, labeling problems as ones of law has the effect of
undermining the morale of cops, who are told they are law enforcement
crimefighters, when it is apparent that their job mostly involves anything
but.153 We mislead cops when we hire them, train them, and send them out
on the street to be crimefighters. No wonder many express dismay at how illsuited they are to the task. As one police officer explained in response to a
question about police responsibility for homelessness, “We are not trained or
equipped to ‘help’ these people. We are the police, tasked with dealing with
the ‘crimes,’ not social disorders that no one else seems to be able to deal with.
Quite frankly, it’s not our job.”154
Often when police are called, the real issue is dealing with social disorder.
Police come wrapped in the veneer of the law when law enforcement may be

uploads/2015/12/09060720/CriminalRecords-report2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9BA-8J5E] (discussing
the effects of criminal records on families).
147 See DAVIS, supra note 126, at 98-120.
148 WILLIAM J. BRATTON, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, BROKEN WINDOWS AND QUALITY-OFLIFE POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 6 (2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/
pdf/analysis_and_planning/qol.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F3L-MDGN].
149 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 532
(2001) (“[L]egislatures tend to create new crimes not to solve the problem, but to give the voters the
sense that they are doing something about it.”).
150 See id. at 509 (“As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the hands
of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how long.”).
151 DAVIS, supra note 126, at 98-120.
152 See supra Section I.A (discussing the “direct harms of policing”).
153 See BITTNER, supra note 9, at 42 (“[T]he view that crime control is the only serious,
important, and necessary part of police work has deleterious effects on the morale of those police
officers in the uniformed patrol who spend most of their time with other matters.”).
154 Robert Hartmann McNamara, Charles Crawford & Ronald Burns, Policing the Homeless: Policy,
Practice, and Perceptions, 36 POLICING: AN INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 357, 367 (2013).
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counterproductive. Some of the problems they face may require the presence,
if not the deployment, of force. But many require another set of skills entirely,
the sorts of skills we turn to next.
3. The Mediator Cop
As should be obvious by this point, a lot of problems to which people call
the cops involve disputes. Domestic disputes, noise disputes, neighbor
trouble, people on other people’s property. People sitting on stoops, being
raucous on corners. People complaining about things they observe and
wanting the cops to put a stop to it.
Gentrifying neighborhoods are a particular situs of these sorts of disputes.
One group of people has used a neighborhood for a long time a certain way.
Another group of people move in. They have different values and
expectations. A different conception of order.155 911 calls are frequent from
gentrifying areas, asking someone to “police” the boundaries of acceptable
behavior.156 As though there is one clear answer.
Race also is a pervasive issue in calls to the police. We’ve been treated
repeatedly to viral videos of people calling the police on people of color
selling water, barbequing, moving into apartments, selling real estate. Making
a call from a hotel lobby where they are a paying guest.157 Ultimately, cops are
forced to arbitrate. To try to calm down a domestic dispute. To tell one side
to turn its music down or move along. To put an end to a party. Or to send a
neighbor back to bed, unhappy about the turmoil.
At the end of these disputes there are sometimes enforcement actions.
Enforcement often occurs simply because mediation fails. Because disputes
escalate despite the presence (or because of the presence) of the police. And
when mediation fails and enforcement occurs, society again faces the panoply
of harms that result from enforcement actions.
There’s no particular reason to believe the people who become police are
particularly good at this sort of dispute resolution. They might be, but then
155 See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE
MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 183
(2018) (“A group of young people standing on the street corner might be perceived as disorderly and
threatening, but they could also be seen as vivacious friends, children of the community, or just plain
neighborly, depending on who is doing the perceiving and where.”).
156 See Abdallah Fayyad, The Criminalization of Gentrifying Neighborhoods, ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/the-criminalization-of-gentrifying-neighborhoods/
548837 [https://perma.cc/UBK6-5R2Z] (“[A]s demographics shift, activity that was previously considered
normal becomes suspicious, and newcomers—many of whom are white—are more inclined to get law
enforcement involved.”).
157 See, e.g., Molly Harbarger, Portland Hotel Calls Cops on Black Guest in Lobby, OREGONIAN
(Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.oregonlive.com/business/2018/12/portland-hotel-calls-cops-on-blackguest-in-lobby.html [https://perma.cc/G2A5-SFBE].
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again, they may not. Some officers undoubtedly are better than others. We
don’t test for it. We don’t do much to train for it. Many learn on the job.
The question, though, is how often enforcement actions that are taken
could have been avoided if there were trained mediators available. The idea
is not farfetched. In France, local governments employ agents de mediation,
who occupy public spaces and troubled neighborhoods precisely for the
purpose of helping people work out their disputes.158 There are questions
about how well trained they are, or how well they perform, but no matter how
effective that particular example is, the concept is worthy: one could strive to
do it well.159 To substitute mediation and dispute resolution for enforcement.
A video of a mother at the Human Resources Administration office in
New York, waiting to get benefits for her and her young infant, and having
her infant pried out of her arms after the police were called because she was
complaining about her wait, went viral on social media.160 This is a classic
example where we should ask why the police were there, and what they should
be doing. It turns out incidents like this at HRA offices are not infrequent.161
Perhaps what is needed is better service at those offices, and staff trained to
deal with people who are forced to wait long periods of time, who
understandably become impatient as they juggle the need for benefits with
the need to hold down a job, to care for a child. It’s hard to believe law
enforcement is the answer, in all but the most extreme situations.
When dispute resolution is called for, we may well want force and law in
the background. As we’ve discussed, disputes can go sour. A domestic fight
can turn into domestic violence; a barroom dispute can get ugly. How in the
background may depend on whether the presence of the police would
exacerbate things, or quell them.
But the one inescapable conclusion is that we would do well to put
mediating disputes out front, effectively. It is hard to believe the benefits of
doing so don’t hugely outweigh the costs. In current practice we try—cops
158 See, e.g., François Bonnet, Jacques de Maillard & Sebastian Roché, Plural Policing of Public
Places in France. Between Private and Local Policing, 2 EUR. J. POLICING STUD. 285, 290-91 (2015)
(describing the origin and function of mediation agents in France).
159 See id. at 293-94 (discussing the challenges mediators face).
160 See Monae, FACEBOOK (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/nyashia.ferguson/
videos/2165023130216850 [https://perma.cc/N6UL-H86W] (displaying an aggressive interaction with
police officers); see also Ashley Southall, ‘Appalling’ Video Shows the Police Yanking 1-Year-Old from His
Mother’s Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/09/nyregion/nypdjazmine-headley-baby-video.html [https://perma.cc/6E2T-7ZME] (describing the incident).
161 See Ashley Southall & Nikita Stewart, They Grabbed Her Baby and Arrested Her. Now Jazmine
Headley Is Speaking Out, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/16/nyregion/jazmine-headley-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/G749-P5WB] (describing how
the mother whose child was taken from her at the HRA office “has become a cause célèbre for New
Yorkers who depend on food stamps and cash public assistance and who say they are often met with
hostility and are sometimes threatened with arrest at city benefits offices”).
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rarely rush in and start arresting people; they talk through it, learn, try to
solve the situation. It’s just that we don’t put formal resources into making
these initial steps effective, and we should.
4. The Social Worker Cop
A lot of what cops are asked to do in response to calls is be social workers.
Cops are forced to play “veterinary surgeon, mental welfare officer, marriage
guidance counselor, home-help to the infirm, welfare worker friend and
confid[a]nt.”162 Cops are asked to deal with problems within families and
other relationships: domestic violence, marital disputes, and the like.163 There
is mental illness, homelessness, substance abuse.
The ratio of problems that require social work solutions as opposed to
other types of responses, such as force or law, is unclear. There’s a saying in
the social work profession that cops are called upon eighty–twenty to do
social work over crime fighting, but they are trained twenty–eighty on social
work versus their other functions.164 Yet, a 1987 study showed a range of from
fifty to ninety percent of a cop’s time is spent on social work functions.165
Another study, of non-dispatched calls to a seven-digit emergency line,
indicated that cops are called upon twenty-six percent of the time for general
advice, and twenty-two percent of the time for victim’s needs.166 For one
department in California in 2016, over thirty percent of the calls for service
were for homeless people alone.167
What is clear is that these are not the things for which cops are trained.
“These problems do not usually involve criminal action and rarely require
arrest, prosecution, trial and punishment.”168 Responding to the opioid crisis,
the Newton, Ohio chief said that “[l]aw enforcement has been forced to take
the lead on this, and we probably are not the best profession to be doing this

Lamin & Teboh, supra note 116, at 6.
See Rhoda A. Michaels & Harvey Treger, Social Work in Police Departments, SOC. WORK,
Sept. 1973, at 67, 67 (“Problems of marriage, the family, mental health, and personal assistance make
up the majority of the situations in which policemen are called upon to intervene.”).
164 George T. Patterson, Police Social Work: A Unique Area of Practice Arising from Law
Enforcement Functions, NAT’L ASS’N SOC. WORKERS (July 2008), https://www.naswnyc.org/
page/77/Police-Social-Work.htm [https://perma.cc/6VRE-XNEX]; see also John A. Webster, Police
Task and Time Study, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 94, 100 (1970) (“The police do
perform social work. In fact, they perform more social work than they perform law enforcement.”).
165 See Harvey Treger, Police Social Work, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK (20th ed. 2008).
166 Katherine Hooper Briar, Emergency Calls to Police: Implications for Social Work Intervention¸
59 SOC. SERV. REV. 593, 596-99 (1985).
167 CHPD: Over 30% of Calls to Police Dept. Are Homeless-Related, CITRUS HEIGHTS SENTINEL
(Cal., July 21, 2016, 7:11 PM), https://citrusheightssentinel.com/2016/07/20/police-30-calls-chpdhomeless-related [https://perma.cc/U34U-DUAF].
168 Michaels & Treger, supra note 163, at 67-68.
162
163
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because our job really is to enforce laws.”169 His compatriot, the sheriff in
Essex County, Massachusetts, says that when he came out of the academy
policing was about fighting crime, but “[n]ow police officers have to be
generalists. You have to enforce the law, you have to be social-service workers
and almost mental-health workers.”170 Yet, we’ve seen how little police
training goes to the social work function.
Nor do cops really want to deal with these problems, either because they
don’t like doing so, or perhaps they just feel ill-suited. A chief superintendent
in London says that dealing with the homeless “tie[s] up” resources and that
you find yourself picking them up only to have them back out on the street
after a fine.171 In a 2013 study of police departments, officers being interviewed
commonly said that “it should not be the responsibility of the police” to deal
with the homeless population.172
Domestic calls provide one of the most vivid examples of how our reliance
on traditional policing alone may be misplaced. These calls are often more
frequent than all the other calls about violent crime combined, and they
certainly top the list of situations in which force potentially is needed.173 But,
they also take more time than other calls, precisely because they involve “tasks
required beyond routine law enforcement duties.”174 Besides mediation,
domestic disputes require a fair amount of dealing with victimization, the
classic functions of the social worker or psychologist.175
Because it is the job and training of cops to enforce the law, law is the
response we often apply to many problems better suited to social work. Take
169 Katie Zezima, As Opioid Overdoses Rise, Police Officers Become Counselors, Doctors and Social
Workers, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/as-opioidoverdoses-rise-police-officers-become-counselors-doctors-and-social-workers/2017/03/12/85a99ba6fa9c-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c90af58eec2d [https://perma.
cc/P3C4-P42P].
170 Id.
171 Donald Saelinger, Note, Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances Criminalizing
Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 562 (2006).
172 McNamara et al., supra note 154, at 367.
173 See KLEIN, supra note 52, at 1 (“Domestic-violence-related police calls have been found to
constitute the single largest category of calls received by police, accounting for 15 to more than 50
percent of all calls.”).
174 Jacqueline Corcoran, Margaret Stephenson, Derrelyn Perryman & Shannon Allen,
Perceptions and Utilization of a Police—Social Work Crisis Intervention Approach to Domestic Violence, 82
FAMS. IN SOC’Y 393, 393 (2001).
175 See DEAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 17 (“The resolution of domestic violence is not primarily
a law enforcement problem . . . . [It] requires an immediate, coordinated response where victim,
batterer and other family members are referred to a range of services . . . .”). See generally, Aya
Gruber, How Police Became the Go-to Response to Domestic Violence, SLATE (July 7, 2020, 4:03 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/07/policing-domestic-violence-history.html [https://perma.cc/
9XRY-8L7B] (describing the feminist push to involve police in domestic disputes in the 1970s, and
thinking about alternatives to police involvement today).
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the homeless. We’ve criminalized most aspects of their very being, from
sleeping on streets to trespass laws to laws aimed at performing personal
functions in public.176 We use nuisance laws to deal with them.177 A student
of homelessness and alternatives to enforcement explained that “[o]ne of the
consistent messages from my conversations is that decision-makers often turn
to enforcement because of a perceived lack of alternatives.”178
Yet, we’ve also seen how these problems are chronic, and are not being
solved by the application of force or law. How police are called to the same
location, or to deal with the same person time and again. How people in need
of social work services cycle in and out of jails, how the police perform a
revolving door law enforcement function that is of dubious value. In the 1960s
and 1970s we went through massive deinstitutionalization of the mentally
ill.179 Over time we’ve simply substituted one institution (the criminal law and
its jails) for another (hospitals). One doubts the former is making us better off.
What is needed for these calls is some sort of social work function. A way
of determining the underlying problems that brought police to the location
or person in the first place and directing resources there. If not, the problem
simply is destined to repeat itself.
5. The Traffic Cop
There are more than 20 million police encounters each year with
motorists. For many officers, traffic enforcement is their most frequent
contact with the public they serve.180 Cops patrolling the streets, cops by the
side of the road (hidden or not)—these are familiar sights.

176 See, e.g., Michael Bishop, Bridget DuPey, Nicole Jones, Ashley Kline, Joshua Mitson &
Darren O’Connor, Too High a Price 2: Move On to Where? 3 (Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of L. Legal
Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18-14, 2018) (“[T]he unfortunate reality of too many
homeless individuals is that they are criminalized for simple life-sustaining activities and ‘moved on’
for being visibly poor.”); Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-Bowers & Kristen E. Brown, Out of
Sight—Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 145, 146-47 (1999) (noting that, instead of getting to the root causes of
homelessness and actively assisting people experiencing homelessness, we have used the criminal
justice system to remove them from the streets).
177 See, e.g., Bishop et al., supra note 176, at 3 (describing how Colorado cities criminalize
essential human functions using “move-on” orders, ticketing and jail).
178 LUCY ADAMS, IN THE PUBLIC EYE: ADDRESSING THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF LAWS
REGULATING PUBLIC SPACE ON PEOPLE EXPERIENCING HOMELESSNESS 7 (2014).
179 Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of
Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 54 (2011) (“All in all, from 1955 to 1980, the
number of persons institutionalized in mental health facilities declined by 75%.”).
180 Pierson et al., supra note 3, at 736; see also Conover & Liederbach, supra note 99, at 175-76
tbl.3 (breaking down how many police interactions with members of the public are because of traffic
related issues).
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The traffic cop function—how many of us experience the police—is itself
deeply in need of disaggregation. Traffic cops help stranded motorists with
broken down cars, they take reports in motor vehicle accidents, they direct
traffic around serious incidents in which other responders are needed. They
set and staff speed “traps.” They stop and question those in violation of traffic
laws—sometimes to enforce those laws, sometimes pretextually in a (usually
failed) effort to ferret out other crime.181 These are all, on reflection, very
different things.
Other than the fact that we’re used to it, many if not most of these “traffic”
functions don’t require sworn officers trained in force and law at all, and some
of the ones that do—pretextual stops—may be causing more harm than
good.182 A stranded motorist needs AAA more than the state patrol.183 It’s
true that police write up reports of automobile accidents, but a good question
is why. Ever have a cop take a report from you? There is every reason to
believe trained report-takers chosen for a skillset more adept at report-writing
might do better. New Orleans recently endorsed NOPD hiring third-party
report-takers for accidents in which there is no injury and no concern about
a driver under the influence, in order to free up cops for where they are
needed most.184 The idea seems so obvious one wonders why (union
opposition aside) we did not do it long ago.
Even traffic enforcement doesn’t necessarily require officers. Berkeley,
California is experimenting with unarmed public employees who are not
police for traffic stops.185 Many tickets for running red lights are issued
administratively after red light cameras capture the violation.186 More of this
could occur. Speed guns and cameras could catch violators of speed limits.

181 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the
Supreme Court has approved most traffic stops “so long as [an officer] can point to a pretextual
justification after the fact”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (upholding pretextual
stops); Harris, supra note 4, at 559.
182 See POLICING PROJECT, supra note 3, at 7-10 (finding that traffic stops in Nashville,
Tennessee, resulted in racial disparities and failed to reduce crime); Pierson et al., supra note 3;
Rushin & Edwards, supra note 3, at 41-48, 58-60 (noting the harmful consequences of discretionary
police stops).
183 See AAA Fact Sheet, AAA NEWSROOM, https://perma.cc/7ZEN-AGVC for the availability
of AAA roadside services to help motorists with disabled vehicles.
184 Beau Evans, Civilians Could Investigate Your Next Fender-Bender, After City Green-Lights Plan, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 22, 2019, 1:56 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/traffic/article_8df201dad3b4-5e64-b8fb-a373e7de8c87.html [https://perma.cc/7ZSC-7L79].
185 ASSOCIATED PRESS, Berkeley Moves Toward Removing Police From Traffic Stops, ABC NEWS
(July 15, 2020, 11:28 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/berkeley-moves-removing-policetraffic-stops-71796720 [https://perma.cc/G54N-PTJJ].
186 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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License plate readers could identify those whose registration has expired and
send notices by mail.187
There’s plenty of reason to question whether we actually want this sort of
Big Brother automated traffic enforcement. Too many jurisdictions use traffic
enforcement as a source of income.188 It’s not clear why this is appropriate—
doubts about that cause cities and departments to deny there are quotas, even
as officers and their unions suggest otherwise.189 This form of income raising
is highly discretionary and deeply raced.190
But the central point is that we need to stop and think about whether we
want to use people trained primarily in force and law to do this work. Not
only are cops a limited resource, but harm flows when we use cops for traffic
enforcement. The task is highly discretionary, and by now it is clear beyond
any question that traffic enforcement is deeply tilted against minorities.191
Every police stop is another opportunity for something to go badly, for the
cop or the person stopped. Sandra Bland was stopped for failure to signal a

187 See Allison Klein & Josh White, License Plate Readers: A Useful Tool for Police Comes with
Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/licenseplate-readers-a-useful-tool-for-police-comes-with-privacy-concerns/2011/11/18/gIQAuEApcN_
story.html [https://perma.cc/B6DX-CEY6] (exploring the enforcement benefits and privacy costs
of license plate readers).
188 See Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines: A Special Report, GOVERNING (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/fine-fee-revenues-special-report.html
[https://perma.cc/7W8E-VTUH] (investigating how cities and towns rely on speeding tickets,
parking citations, and other traffic fines and fees to fund their budgets); Jeffrey Fagan & Elliot Ash,
New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33, 46-52 (2017)
(providing an overview of numerous different forms of fines and fees); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R.
DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2015) (“The City [of Ferguson]
budgets for sizeable increases in municipal fines and fees each year, exhorts police and court staff to
deliver those revenue increases, and closely monitors whether those increases are achieved.”).
189 See, e.g., Joel Rubin & Catherine Saillant, LAPD to Pay $10 Million in Traffic Ticket Quota
Controversy, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-xpm2013-dec-10-la-me-ln-ticket-quota-20131210-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZQN6-ZLSW] (reporting
the Los Angeles City Council’s decision to “pay nearly $6 million to a group of police officers who
accused their superiors of imposing a secret traffic ticket quota system” despite those superior
officers’ denials).
190 See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST LOW-INCOME
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 3 (2017)
(finding that the impacts of fines and fees “have been borne by communities of color, along with the
poor,” and that municipalities that rely heavily on revenue from fines and fees have a higher than
average percentage of minority populations).
191 See Pierson et al., supra note 3, at 736 (“In both state patrol and municipal police stops, we
find . . . discrimination in stop decisions.”); David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle
Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 831 (2002) (cataloguing the shift
to invasive traffic stops); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 958 (1999) (noting that certain police actions, including traffic stops,
are racially discriminatory); Harris, supra note 4, at 546 (describing phenomenon of “driving while black”).
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lane change.192 The incident escalated and she was arrested; she committed
suicide three days later, the county paid a $1.9 million dollar judgment, and
the officer was indicted on perjury charges that were settled after he promised
to leave law enforcement forever.193 Were we net better off for that discretionary
stop? For having a cop in that place at that time, doing what he did?
The ultimate question is how much of the traffic cop role we need
altogether, and how much of that role needs to be performed by armed
individuals trained in law enforcement. Sure, it’s possible that even the helping
hand for the stranded motorist could turn ugly. Then again, AAA helps lots of
stranded motorists daily without armed assistance ever proving necessary.
What we may need instead are cadres of report takers, and political decisions
about how much to automate traffic enforcement. The enforcement universe
might look a lot different, with far better outcomes, if we did those things.
6. The Crime-Fighting, Law Enforcement Cop
Ironically, the same might be said of what is thought of as the core
function of police: crime-fighting and law enforcement. If anything seems
quintessentially what cops should do, this is it. Yet, even here, the pieces of
crime-fighting need to be taken apart and considered separately.
Looking at data from Wilmington, Delaware in 1985–86, a couple of
scholars pushed back on what was becoming the common wisdom that cops
spent little of their time fighting crime.194 Greene and Klockars looked not
just at patrol officers, but also other units like detectives and community
policing officers. They noted that even though many calls prove unfounded,
officers can’t know for sure until they get there, and also that a fair amount of
what some call “order maintenance” really is dealing with crime. By their
calculation, once they eliminated “personal” and “clear” time (i.e. on patrol but
not dispatched), some half of the duties officers perform are crime-related.195
Still, even Greene and Klockars recognized that although one could
characterize a much higher volume of what officers do as “crime-fighting,”
ultimately the activities in which cops were engaged consisted mostly of afterthe-fact report writing and other administrative or investigatory tasks.196
Disaggregation here is important. Cops were “determining whether or not what
was reported as a crime was or should be reported as one, interviewing witnesses,
192 Brian Collister, Sandra Bland Recorded Her Own Arrest. Watch Her Cellphone Video from the
2015 Traffic Stop, WFAA (May 7, 2019, 7:26 AM), https://www.wfaa.com/article/
news/investigations/sandra-bland-recorded-her-own-arrest-watch-her-cellphone-video-from-the2015-traffic-stop/287-44ff2f5b-f481-48c3-a5ca-fad15296d979 [https://perma.cc/QVN7-TMBH].
193 Id.
194 Greene & Klockars, supra note 136.
195 Id. at 281 tbl.3 & 4.
196 Id. at 279 tbl.1.
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gathering evidence, advising victims, writing reports, and otherwise assisting in
the management of the aftermath of victimizations.”197 In short, they too agreed
that the “findings in no way lend support to the headline news vision of police
work as a violent running battle between police and criminals.”198
There is something to be said, of course, for rapid response by force- and
law-trained individuals to emergent situations involving serious criminal
activity, even if the activity only is speculative. This means sending officers out
to innumerable calls for “suspicions persons” or residential and business alarms
going off, or reports of “crime in progress” even when the result is a false alarm.
Even here, though, we also need to realize that far too many of these calls are
made by overly snoopy or paranoid people, and that some not insubstantial
portion of those are driven by racial bias, conscious or unconscious.
But what data and anecdote tell us is that cops mostly don’t arrive while
things are in progress, when force is most likely to be needed.199 Callers
sometimes wait until criminal incidents are over, or rapid response is only so
rapid. It turns out to be relatively rare that officers come upon a culprit in the
act, or even catch up with one in the immediate aftermath. When it came to
actually responding to crimes in progress, Greene and Klockars found that
“the average police officer spent about 1 hour per week” on that task.200
Technology may (or may not) be improving upon this.201
The aftermath of a call about criminal activity is another thing entirely; here
the need for officers whose main skills and abilities are to deploy force and effect
arrests is extremely dubious. Those functions could be broken down into three
separate things: interviewing witnesses and gathering evidence, helping victims
and those suffering from trauma, and post hoc investigation to clear crimes.202
It’s certainly possible to charge officers with the first function, evidence
gathering and report writing, but the question remains whether they are the
best at it. They receive training for it, no doubt.203 Still, for the more serious
Id. at 283.
Id.
See PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN
DISTRICT 96 (2008) (“[T]he vast majority of the time most 911 callers . . . wait until the suspect is
gone before reporting a crime. . . . And if police do not arrive within one minute of a crime, rapid
police response has virtually no effect.”).
200 Greene & Klockars, supra note 136, at 283.
201 See NANCY G. LA VIGNE, PAIGE S. THOMPSON, DANIEL S. LAWRENCE & MARGARET
GOFF, URB. INST., IMPLEMENTING GUNSHOT DETECTION TECHNOLOGY 8-10
(2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101161/implementing_gunshot_detec
tion_technology_recommendations_for_law_enforcement_and_municipal_partners.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L99F-F3UY] (discussing the effective implementation of gunshot detection technology,
including to arrive at the scene of shots more rapidly).
202 See Greene & Klockars, supra note 136, at 283.
203 See REAVES, ACADEMIES 2013, supra note 92, at 5 (finding that police recruits received an
average of twenty-five hours of training on report writing and forty-two hours on investigations).
197
198
199
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of crimes, like homicide, we displace patrol officers very quickly and bring in
specialized units. Gathering forensic evidence is a particular skill, one that
takes great care and attention to detail.204 Recent breakthroughs in forensic
science suggest we need way less police and much more dispassionate
evidence collection and evaluation to get things right.205 Interviewing
witnesses requires a certain combination of skepticism and emotional
intelligence: getting people to feel comfortable enough to open up, and
probing to make sure stories hang together.206 Cops may be good at one and
not necessarily at the other. Then there is the writing of reports so that there
is an accurate record. As we saw with traffic accident reports, it is not clear
that this is what officers are best-suited to.
As for helping victims, this is something police officers seem notoriously
bad at, and understandably so. Officers are barely trained at this.207 Certainly
for crimes involving sexual violation, many victims report on how the system
did not treat them humanely, how it often felt like the initial crime was
compounded.208 Others in society are trained far better.209 Why we would
deploy police rather than social workers in this instance is a mystery.
Even for the post hoc detective function, there’s every reason to believe
some set of individuals with specialized training would outperform those we
charge with this task. It is not obvious that the best people for the job are
204 Although the necessary qualifications to be a forensics expert vary, the experience and
accuracy of the expert’s past conclusions are key. Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, The
Proficiency of Experts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 908 (2018).
205 See Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our
Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 641-42 (2014) (lamenting that “evidence
collection and preservation continues to be left almost entirely to the discretion of police” and
suggesting that “as a result, the rate of collection, submission, and analysis of crime scene evidence
is abysmally low”); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 34 (2009) (finding that “[a]lmost all of the analysts testifying
in” 137 trials that resulted in wrongful convictions “worked for police laboratories”).
206 See Greene & Klockars, supra note 136, at 283 (arguing that police should be trained “to
guard against the insensitivity that can come from dealing routinely with people in crises”).
207 See REAVES, ACADEMIES 2013, supra note 92, at 7 (reporting that police recruits received
an average of five hours of victim response training); Helen M. Eigenberg, Victor E. Kappeler &
Karen McGuffee, Confronting the Complexities of Domestic Violence: A Social Prescription for Rethinking
Police Training, 12 J. POLICE CRISIS NEGOTS. 122, 135 (2012) (suggesting that police training on
domestic violence focuses on officer safety over victim services); Scott W. Peters, Heather C. Trepal,
Sabina M. de Vries, Sally W. Day & Christopher Leeth, Victims of Domestic Violence and Front-Line
Workers: A Helping Paradigm, 36 MICH. J. COUNSELING 8, 9 (2009) (explaining that when police
officers receive only basic domestic violence training, the training usually does not focus on
addressing victim needs).
208 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 73, at 30-31, 37 (noting that most rape victims in the study
experienced secondary victimization during their contact with police, and that this re-victimization
can have serious consequences including depression and reluctance to seek further help).
209 See id. at 38 (finding that victims who are assisted by a rape victim advocate report more
positive experiences with legal and medical systems).
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those who were once patrol officers, did well at that job for a while, and then
passed a test for more training as a detective.210 Nor do statistics give much
support for the fact that cop-detectives are the best at this job. Clearance rates
for homicides alone are a disappointment (to say the least) in communities
most afflicted with crime.211 People whose property is stolen don’t expect
really to get it back, and are surprised when they do.212
The bottom line is that even the crime-fighting function can be
disaggregated, and it should be. In order to achieve optimal outcomes in all
aspects of crime—dealing with emergent situations, collecting evidence,
handling witness trauma, writing reports, investigating and identifying
culprits—we need to match skills to the task. We are not doing this at present.
7. The Proactive Cop
There’s one particular aspect of “crime fighting”—what goes by the name
of “proactive policing”—that needs a closer look and its own disaggregation.
Beginning in the 1980s there was a sense that the police should be more
proactive in fighting crime.213 Broken windows, quality of life, zero tolerance,
hot spot policing; all of these have been used to describe what are at times
interrelated proactive approaches to the policing function that involve
stepped up enforcement in ways not directly responsive to a call for service.214
As with the rest of policing, proactive policing needs to be taken apart to
determine whether and what police officers should be doing.

210 See, e.g., Career Ladders, LAPD CAREERS, https://www.joinlapd.com/career-ladders
[https://perma.cc/MR8A-CUSG] (explaining how to become a detective with the Los Angeles
Police Department); CHI. POLICE, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT DETECTIVE SELECTION
PROCESS
(2016),
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dhr/general/Detective_
Candidate_Preparation_Guide-FINAL2-10-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLN8-8EC3] (describing
how to become a detective with the Chicago Police Department).
211 See Wash. Post Investigative Team, Murder with Impunity, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/murder-with-impunity/
[https://perma.cc/D29N-RQSA] (“In the past decade, nearly 26,000 murders have gone without an
arrest in major American cities. Of those, more than 18,600 of the victims—almost three-quarters—
were black.”); Sarah Ryley, Jeremy Singer-Vine & Sean Campbell, 5 Things to Know about Cities’
Failure to Arrest Shooters, TRACE (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.thetrace.org/2019/01/gun-murdersolve-rate-understaffed-police-data-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/P7JM-UMH8] (“[D]etectives are
failing to make arrests in all but a fraction of murders and assaults committed with guns . . . . Arrest
rates are lower when the victim is black or Hispanic.”).
212 See John Gramlich, Most Violent and Property Crimes in the U.S. Go Unsolved, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/01/most-violent-and-property-crimesin-the-u-s-go-unsolved/ [https://perma.cc/Y2Q8-S3NQ] (“Only about half of the violent crimes and a
third of the property crimes that occur in the United States each year are reported to police. And most
of the crimes that are reported don’t result in the arrest, charging and prosecution of a suspect . . . .”).
213 See PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS, supra note 37, at 16 (recounting this historical shift).
214 See id. at 2 tbl.S-1 (categorizing forms of proactive policing).
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In considering proactive policing, some conflate enforcement efforts with
collaborative work between police and communities—what often is called
“community policing.”215 In terms of achieving public safety in optimal ways,
that’s a mistake. Enforcement-driven proactive policing, and community policing
efforts, are two very different things, like mixing apples and carburetors. Herman
Goldstein, a social scientist who spent years with the Chicago Police Department,
and is the parent of problem-oriented policing, put it pithily:
[A] department could not long tolerate a situation in which officers in a
residential area go out of their way to demonstrate that they are caring,
service-oriented individuals, while other officers assigned to a roving task
force make wholesale sweeps of loitering juveniles in that community. Such
activities greatly diminish the credibility of officers who have invested heavily
in developing rapport.216

Officers in a study in the United Kingdom about an intensive community
policing effort that seemed to be paying dividends, recognized there was a
conflict between their buddying up to young folks and the fact that if things
went badly enforcement would follow—and thus “I have got to keep that
distance professionally.”217 Community policing simply is a different thing,
which we will return to later.
In proactive law enforcement, whatever the terminology used to describe it,
there are really two different things going on. One relates to quality of life, the
other to crime-fighting. They are not the same and need to be treated differently.
Proactive policing for crime control purposes has for the most part been
discredited, except when used under a “hot spot” model.218 It turns out going
around town jacking everyone up for everything doesn’t do much to fight
serious crime.219 It’s all too diffuse to deter individuals bent on serious
See infra note 234 and accompanying text (defining community policing).
Herman Goldstein, Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic Requirements, and
Threshold Questions, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 6, 12-13 (1987).
217 DANIEL MCCARTHY, “SOFT” POLICING: THE COLLABORATIVE CONTROL OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 144 (2014).
218 See generally Justin McCrary & Deepak Premkumar, Why We Need Police, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 65, 79 (Tamara Rice Lave & Eric
J. Miller eds., 2019) (“[W]e illustrate that there is limited to no evidence to suggest that disorder or
proactive policing is an effective means to deter crime, but there are evaluations which support the
use of hot-spots . . . .”).
219 See ALEX CHOHLAS-WOOD, SHARAD GOEL, AMY SHOEMAKER & RAVI SHROFF, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S TRAFFIC STOP
PRACTICES 8 (2018) (finding that traffic stops had no effect on serious crime rates); PROACTIVE
POLICING: EFFECTS, supra note 37, at 227 (finding that there is not strong enough evidence to draw
a conclusion on the impact of “broken windows policing on fear of crime or on collective efficacy”);
JAMES CULLEN & AMES GRAWERT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., FACT SHEET: STOP AND
FRISK’S EFFECT ON CRIME IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2016) (“Statistically, no relationship between
stop-and-frisk and crime seems apparent.”).
215
216
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offending. Hot spot policing, on the other hand, involves intensive effort
directed at small criminogenic areas, often but a few blocks, in order to reduce
crime.220 In study after study, hot spot policing has been shown to lower
crime, without displacing it to surrounding areas, although the degree to
which it does so also varies from study to study and in some of the most
careful studies the effects can be small.221
But even if heavy enforcement of misdemeanors made no sense for
fighting crime, there still would be the quality-of-life aspect of the work. The
utility of quality-of-life enforcement to enhance quality of life itself is
undeniable as a causal matter (whatever one thinks of the collateral harms).
The sorts of conduct that challenge quality of life can range widely, from
noise complaints to “squeegee men” to public drinking and smoking of
marijuana to public urination. Both Bill Bratton (the former Chief or
Commissioner in Boston, Los Angeles, and New York) and George Kelling
(the sociologist and co-author of the original work on Broken Windows
policing) stress that calls to deal with this sort of problem come frequently
from low-income and minority neighborhoods.222 Kelling explained that the
whole broken windows approach derived from his spending time in
challenged neighborhoods; when people were asked to identify their five most
serious concerns, “at least three, but more likely four, would be ‘minor
problems:’ graffiti, youths drinking in parks, ‘homeless’ peeing on their
stoops, prostitutes attempting to hustle fathers in front of their
children . . . and so on.”223 If acts like public urination are a problem in a
neighborhood or unwelcome by residents, then enforcing against it will
indeed alleviate the problem itself.
What ties both quality of life and crime-fighting aims together, however, is the
question of whether there are ways to achieve the same ends with less harm. Force
and law enforcement may not be the order of the day, if there are alternatives.

220 See Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos & David M. Hureau, The Effects of Hot Spots
Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 635-37 (2014)
(defining hot spots policing).
221 See id. at 658 (“[H]ot spots policing programs generate modest crime control gains and are
likely to produce a diffusion of crime control benefits into areas immediately surrounding targeted
high-activity crime places.”); Lawrence W. Sherman & David Wiesburd, General Deterrent Effects of
Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625, 643 (1995) (finding
twenty-five percent less disorder in areas where police doubled the number of patrols with no
displacement to surrounding areas).
222 See George Kelling, Don’t Blame My ‘Broken Windows’ Theory for Poor Policing, POLITICO
MAG. (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/broken-windows-theorypoor-policing-ferguson-kelling-121268 [perma.cc/KK5S-3MF9]; see also BRATTON, supra note 148,
at 7 (reporting that African-Americans supported broken windows by thirty-seven to fifty-six
percent in the aftermath of the shooting of Eric Garner).
223 Kelling, supra note 222.
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For example, a couple studies have disaggregated activities at hot spots,
and concluded that though law enforcement has its place, the most effective
approaches are “situational,” such as actually fixing broken windows.224 This
is yet another example of wondering what cops are doing here. The most
interesting study along these lines was conducted by Anthony Braga and
Brenda Bond in Lowell, Massachusetts, where they randomized hot spots and
then applied four very different treatments, attempting to tease out the
effects.225 Part of the effort was indeed “aggressive order maintenance
interventions” such as stepped up police patrols, stop-and-frisk, and more
misdemeanor arrests.226 But there also were social services interventions, such
as providing social workers to those with mental health issues or working to
get homeless individuals into local shelters.227 Finally, there were “situational”
approaches, such as knocking down abandoned buildings and cleaning vacant
lots, or improving street lighting and adding video surveillance.228 The
dependent variable was calls for service, chosen because it rests entirely out
of the hands of the police.229 Notably, in the Braga and Bond study, the most
successful intervention was not misdemeanor enforcement, but the
“situational” strategy, i.e., actually fixing “broken windows.”230 The authors
speculated that “[t]he presence of abandoned buildings . . . attracts offenders
to places,” and that “[c]hanges in the physical environment may discourage
potential offenders from frequenting an area by altering criminal
opportunities at a place.”231
If fixing situational circumstances in troubled neighborhoods is a plus, and
conducting arrests to the point that they defeat community trust is a negative,
then this has serious implications for the role of the police, even in the most
crime-ridden of places. Braga and Bond recommended that police
departments should shy away from “zero tolerance” approaches that remove
224 See Braga et al., supra note 220, at 633 (“Our analyses find that problem-oriented policing
interventions generate larger mean effect sizes when compared to interventions that simply increase
levels of traditional police actions in crime hot spots.”); Anthony A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing
Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577, 578 (2008)
(“[T]he strongest crime-prevention gains were generated by situational prevention strategies rather
than by misdemeanor arrests or social service strategies.”).
225 Braga & Bond, supra note 224.
226 Id. at 585.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 598.
230 Id. at 599. Calls for service dropped across all ranges of crimes, from robbery to assault;
the only strategy that did not show an effect was the social services strategy. Even it, the authors
concluded, might have long term effects, which did not show up during the relatively short run of
the experiment. Even if not, this social services strategy “could generate desirable side benefits for
the police such as improved relationships with community members.” Id. at 600.
231 Id. at 599.
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those guilty of incivilities “from the street via arrest.”232 They concede that
misdemeanor arrests play a role. But relying on a high number of arrests to
combat serious crime may “undermine relationships in low-income, urban
minority communities” where what is “most needed” is working with
communities to eliminate distrust and co-produce public safety.233
The same might be said for quality of life policing itself. People in all
neighborhoods deserve a good quality of life, and to be free of nuisances, be
they loud noise, public drunkenness, urination. And sometimes force and law
are required. But as we have seen repeatedly, the question is whether we can
adopt situational—public restrooms, anyone?—and other approaches that,
together with some modicum of force and law, achieve better overall
outcomes, rather than thinking one-size-fits-all is our best approach.
8. “Community” Police
Policing leadership understands the importance of relationships with the
community to fight crime. Since the 1970s there has been an emphasis on
“community policing,” an approach that has come to have many meanings.234
The studies on what police actually do, however, suggest that this involved a
lot more talk than action.235 Of late, the discussion has shifted to the “coproduction” of public safety, by which is meant that the police need to work
with community members (and not alienate them) to secure
neighborhoods.236 If there is a difference between the two, it is in giving
communities more voice in how their neighborhoods are policed.
Id. at 600.
Id.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 41-45; see also BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 8 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf [https://perma.cc/848W-MU5V] (“In 2013,
about 7 in 10 local police departments . . . had a mission statement that included a community
policing component.”).
235 In several of the “what do cops do” studies, the differences in behavior between patrol cops
and community policing officers are small. See, e.g., Famega, Proactive Policing, supra note 99, at 89
tbl.1; Smith et al., supra note 99, at 26 tbl.1; Liederbach & Frank, supra note 99, at 65 tbl.2. Even
one study that claimed that community policing efforts “differ substantially from the activities of
beat officers” still indicated precious little crime fighting on the part of beat cops and surprisingly
little community service by the community police. James Frank, Steven G. Brandl & R. Cory
Watkins, The Content of Community Policing: A Comparison of the Daily Activities of Community and
“Beat” Officers, 20 POLICING 716, 723-26 (1997).
236 See PRESIDENT’S TASKFORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 46 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/W638-Y4U6] [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S
TASKFORCE] (“Members of communities are key partners in creating public safety, so communities
and police need mechanisms to engage with each other in consistent and meaningful ways.”); Tracie
Keesee, How Police and the Public Can Create Safer Neighborhoods Together, TED, https://
www.ted.com/talks/tracie_keesee_how_police_and_the_public_can_create_safer_neighborhoods_to
232
233
234
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It’s possible to break down community policing into very different
functions; disaggregation works here too. Some of it is focused on
relationship-building, be it through ice cream socials, or “coffee with a cop,”
an attempt to forge ties and alliances in a community.237 Some of it is about
reorganizing patrol; getting cops out of cars and onto foot or bicycles, to get
to know a community and its conditions and residents better, rather than just
cruising through or conducting “jump outs.”238 Some of it is about actually
hearing the community’s voice on how it wants to be policed.239
There is a real question about some of the jobs we are asking police to do
in this space, and why we think folks trained in force and law are right for
them. For a long while D.A.R.E.—Drug Abuse Resistance Education—a
course taught by cops in schools, was all the rage.240 Studies showed that at
best it had no effect and at worst was counter-productive, though new
versions of the curriculum may be more effective.241 But why, if kids need to
be taught about drugs, would we think police necessarily are the best suited
to the task? Perhaps they might be able to tell tales about scaring kids
straight—though the whole scared straight concept is dubious on its own
merits.242 Even if we accept that police know a lot about drug abuse because
they encounter it often, it is not evident that they are more knowledgeable
than some others, such as addiction therapists and social workers. If it is
education, one might think educators would be best.
gether/transcript?language=en [https://perma.cc/L385-75KE] (describing the coproduction of public
safety in New York).
237 See, e.g., Background, COFFEE WITH A COP, https://coffeewithacop.com/about
[https://perma.cc/4AVD-YB3X] (describing the Coffee with A Cop initiative in Hawthorne,
California, as a way for the police department to interact more successfully with the citizens it
serves); Who We Are, POLICE ATHLETIC LEAGUE NYC, https://www.palnyc.org/who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/JE7Y-VADB] (describing the Police Athletic League in New York).
238 See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Putting Police Officers Back on the Beat, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 12, 2015, 7:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/putting-police-officers-back-on-the-beat1426201176 [https://perma.cc/KBZ4-G5V8] (reporting police departments’ commitment to having
officers walk the beat).
239 See PRESIDENT’S TASKFORCE, supra note 236, at 45 (“Community policing emphasizes
working with neighborhood residents to co-produce public safety.”).
240 See Christopher Ingraham, A Brief History of DARE, the Anti-Drug Program Jeff Sessions Wants
to Revive, WASH. POST (July 12, 2017, 3:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2017/07/12/a-brief-history-of-d-a-r-e-the-anti-drug-program-jeff-sessions-wants-torevive [https://perma.cc/K5UK-HLRB] (explaining that D.A.R.E. drew bipartisan praise and
spread like wildfire).
241 Id.
242 See Frequently Asked Questions, D.A.R.E. N.H., https://www.nh.gov/safety/dare/
faq.html#answer4 [https://perma.cc/HM99-S9XB] (“A police officer deals directly with the
people in the area and he/she can draw from real life examples of how drugs can ruin a life.”); Drug
Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.), LANCASTER, OHIO, https://www.ci.lancaster.
oh.us/204/DARE [https://perma.cc/4R4C-LPV2] (“Police officers are accepted as authorities on
drug abuse, as they deal with drug abuse and its consequences on a daily basis.”).
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Another example is using the police to build “collective efficacy” in
challenged neighborhoods. Theory suggests that social norms break down in
poorer communities because the residents, stretched to the max with life’s
challenges, lack the resources and wherewithal to act as a common unit in
enforcing basic rules.243 There are programs funded by the DOJ to use the
police to help develop this sort of efficacy in communities.244 One can see
why cops might have a role; especially in unsafe places, they can offer some
background protection as the community comes together. But it also might
be the case that this work would be better performed by community
organizers, or other professionals.
In short, although there is most definitely something to be said for the
softer touch of community policing, still one has to wonder what precisely we
are doing asking the police to befriend the community, and whether the police
have the right skillset or are the right people for all these varying functions.
Getting to know people, so they will be open and candid about problems and
their causes, sure. But the police are not social workers: not only are they
inadequately trained for the role, but ultimately they do arrest individuals
who commit crimes. With community policing, as with much else, we have
to be more specific about what we are asking of cops and compare that to what
we train them to do.
III. REIMAGINING PUBLIC SAFETY
If public safety is the goal, it must be clear by now that some change is
called for in our societal response to the problems police encounter. The police
have not—in truth we have not—adequately differentiated the functions that
police officers are asked to perform. Much harm occurs because we send armed

243 See ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 20-24 (1996) (discussing the relationship between joblessness,
social organizations, and crime); Brian R. Higgins & Joel Hunt, Collective Efficacy: Taking Action to
Improve Neighborhoods, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Sept. 2016, at 19, 19 (“Collective efficacy . . . helps
explain why some communities fight crime and disorder and others do not.”); cf. BRUCE WESTERN,
HOMEWARD: LIFE IN THE YEAR AFTER PRISON 181 (2018) (“It is not police, courts, and the threat
of punishment that create public safety, but rather the bonds of community produced by a raft of
social institutions—families, schools, employers, churches, and neighborhoods groups.”).
244 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Just., Justice Department Awards $7 Million to Improve
Responses to Violence, Including Officer Shootings (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-awards-7-million-improve-responses-violence-including-officershootings [https://perma.cc/7HRA-KJDW] (describing a program designed to implement
responsive trauma-informed interventions in communities that have experienced trauma); Reducing
Crime Through Collective Efficacy: Identifying Social Control and Social Cohesion in Miami Neighborhoods,
NAT’L INST. JUST., https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/awards/2009-ij-cx-0039 [https://perma.cc/T98ZQJ7A] (explaining an initiative to study neighborhoods, crime, and collective efficacy in Miami).
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people—who are trained and see their mission as force and law—to deal with
myriad problems not particularly susceptible to this solution.
Complaints today about policing have at their heart this belief that we are
over-funding police, who are not apt to dealing with social problems, and at
the same time failing to support very real community social needs. The
criticism is two-fold. Many want to shift resources dramatically away from
policing to address deeply needed social services. But inherent in that, and
equally important, is a deep critique of how police—acting as first
responders—do their job.245
We need to reimagine the “public safety” function from the ground up.
Society has specialized, but still relies on one-size-fits-all responders. We have
come to see many of the problems the police confront as public health concerns,
and yet we still meet them with the same response. But the problem extends
far beyond that. As Part II made clear, the police as presently trained and
constituted simply are not the best response to the myriad situations to which
they are called, even such things as crime scenes and traffic enforcement. We
need an approach that differentiates functions and meets social problems and
challenges with the sets of skills that can address them adequately.
This Part turns to reimagining how we can provide public safety by
ensuring social problems are addressed in effective and non-harm-producing
ways. It begins (in Section III.A) by looking at how we can develop and
provide the required skills within policing agencies. It then steps outside
those agencies (in Section III.B) to find specialized responses from the rest
of government. Finally, the argument turns, ironically, to reconsider (in
Section III.C) whether specialization is the answer, or whether what we really
need is a whole new type of better-trained generalist first responders. It
concludes (in Section III.D) by considering how we pay for all this,
suggesting that one answer is less criminalization.
A. What Are the Police Doing Here? Rethinking the Policing Agency
Let’s assume, for the moment—and many, rightfully, are challenging this
assumption today—that when trouble calls, it is the police who will continue
to respond. But let’s also recognize that the status quo of responding to a host
of varied issues with armed officers trained primarily in force and law simply
is unacceptable. What might a better set of responses, more effective at
solving problems, and less apt to cause harm, look like?
245 See Andrew, supra note 20 (claiming that police violence and the failures of police reform
leads many to think defunding them is worthwhile); Karma, supra note 21 (arguing that police culture
is too prone to violence and that a reallocation of resources from police to social services is desirable);
Lopez, supra note 20 (contending that police “do too much” and that we need to create an inherently
less violent response force).
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1. Training and Specialization
If anything must cry out from the foregoing discussion it is the need to
train the police differently, perhaps dramatically so. If you train for force and
law, force and law is what you get.246 If you need other skills, then officers
need to be prepared with them.
The kinds of training that need to be ramped up in policing agencies
should by now be apparent. George T. Patterson, an authority on social work
around policing, points to the “communications skills, referrals, mediation,
and conflict resolution” that cops need to handle the problems they
encounter.247 Problem-solving approaches to community problems require a
very different set of skills than crime fighting.248 Training officers to deal with
mental health issues—what often is referred to as critical incident, or CIT,
training—means getting cops to break fundamental patterns of thought,
beginning with the obvious (but seemingly elusive) point that “mental illness
is not a crime; it’s a disease.”249 All officers need a better understanding of
available social services and how to access them.
Even the basic “crime-fighting” task requires rethinking and
differentiated training. Once Greene and Klockars broke the crime-fighting
function into its actual components, they were led to conclude that “[p]olice
training and supervision should give emphasis” to the activities cops actually
pursue.250 More work is needed on report writing, on interviewing witnesses,
on dealing with people who have been victimized. Training should “help
police to guard against the insensitivity that can come from dealing routinely
with people in crises and stress those ways in which police can assist in
situations after victimizations have occurred and when there is no real
prospect that the perpetrator will be found.”251
Of course, no single human being can be all this—forceful crime-fighter,
empathic interviewer and assister of victims, collaborator with communities
and social service agencies, solver of crimes. There’s a serious need to
specialize within policing agencies, which simply is not the norm at present.
The ranked system currently in place in policing agencies moves people from
patrol up through other responsibilities.252 But does one really have to be a

246 See Tony Cheng, Policing and the Illusion of Public Input 28 (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (describing how when residents complain about motorcycles, response of police to
complaints is always to think about enforcement, rather than other alternatives).
247 Patterson, supra note 164.
248 See Lamin & Teboh, supra note 116, at 3, 6-7.
249 DEAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 40.
250 Greene & Klockars, supra note 136, at 283.
251 Id.
252 See Career Ladders, supra note 210 (explaining how a patrol officer becomes a detective).
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patrol officer for years before taking up a specialty in data-driven crime
analytics? Or even in being a detective? These are very different jobs.
One huge cultural problem is that today within policing agencies, those who
perform the force and law function—“real” policing—are seen as core, while
those who do softer things are marginalized.253 This long has been debilitating
to community policing, treated as a sideshow to the real work. Given the
realities of what the police do daily, this culture needs to change somehow.
It’s not at all clear why, from the start, new police officers cannot choose
one of a variety of tracks or directions. Some can be patrol officers, or even
force and law officers. Some can be mediation and community facing experts.
Some can be trained in new technologies and data analytics.
This would be a fundamental shift; retraining cops—and agencies—is not
going to be easy. Police in many European countries have much longer
training paths.254 They often are required to go through two- or three-year
programs to become officers. To be clear, many of those programs still train
people as one-size-fits all cops, but it makes the point how skimpy we are here
in the United States, where the average officer is on the street after a course
of several weeks.255 The highly effective Memphis Model of critical incident
training to deal with calls about people in behavioral crisis alone requires
roughly forty hours; it is startling that a survey of the states found that most
require eight hours or less of schooling in how to deal with those who may be
suffering from mental incapacity.256
2. “Civilianization” and Specialization
There’s another obvious answer, which is that instead of taking officers
trained in force and law and asking them to become other things, policing
agencies simply could hire trained specialists to perform these other roles.

253 See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 453, 518 (2004).
254 See Paul Hirschfield, Why Do American Cops Kill So Many Compared to European Cops?,
CONVERSATION (Nov. 25, 2015, 12:05 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-do-americancops-kill-so-many-compared-to-european-cops-49696 [https://perma.cc/WEJ9-WZJM] (“The
Netherlands, Norway and Finland, for example, require police to attend a national academy—a
college for cops—for three years. In Norway, over 5,000 applicants recently competed for the 700
annual spots.”).
255 REAVES, ACADEMIES 2013, supra note 92, at 1 (“Excluding field training, basic training
programs lasted an average of about 840 hours, or 21 weeks [in 2013].”).
256 MICHAEL S. WOODY, THE ART OF DE-ESCALATION 58 (2005), http://www.olytac.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/Woody.-2005.-The-Art-of-De-Escalation-.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUV5-WMUY]
(describing the training); Megan Pauly, How Police Officers Are (or Aren’t) Trained in Mental Health,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/10/how-police-officers-are-oraren-t-trained-in-mental-health/280485 [https://perma.cc/WFY3-6DZV] (noting that most states require
police officers to undertake an average of eight hours or less of mental health training).
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This commonly is referred to as “civilianizing,” a word that is meant to sit in
opposition to “sworn” officers—those who have completed basic police
training and have lawful authority to effect arrests, as well as special
protections from the law when they exercise force.257 We should deplore the
use of the word “civilian” in this context, because it reifies a military
understanding of the police, and “others” the people the police serve. But we
should consider the value of an approach that relies on fewer sworn officers,
and more specialists.
As of 2006, non-sworn employees constituted roughly 30% of the police
workforce, up from 7.5% in the 1950s.258 Non-sworn personnel are notably
cheaper than sworn officers; they earn less, training costs less, and they have
less in the way of fringe benefits.259 Some old data, from New York, put the
cost of non-sworn officials at one-third to one-half of sworn personnel.260 At
present non-sworn personnel perform a variety of functions, from dispatch
to administrative, to property crime investigations, and even to command.261
Time and technology are turning the required skills of the police on their
heads in terms of what is foreground and what is background, anyway. The
folks who are recruited into the patrol core, and trained to perform that job,
may well lack the aptitude for what is needed or what is coming. The prime
example of this is the increased use of non-sworn personnel on crime analytics
and fighting cybercrime—itself the greatest growing threat that we face.262
Why these tasks should be seen as outside the main mission of policing, or
subsidiary, is only a vestige of policing’s path dependence.
A prime example of what a reimagined policing agency leaning heavily on
specialists might look like is the social work function. There’s a long history
of the relationship between policing and social work. In the early 1900s, as

257 See ROBERT C. DAVIS, MARY E. LOMBARDO, DANIEL J. WOODS, CHRISTOPHER KOPER
& CARL HAWKINS, CIVILIAN STAFF IN POLICING: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 2009 BYRNE
CIVILIAN HIRING PROGRAM 3 (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/246952.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KCM-UWGA] (“Civilian police employees are non-sworn personnel who do not
take an oath and are not empowered to make arrests.”).
258 Id. at 3.
259 Id. at 11.
260 Sid Harring, Taylorization of Police Work: Prospects for the 1980s, 11 CRITICAL SOCIO. 25, 27
(1981); see also CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL., POLICE STAFFING AUDIT 3 (2002), https://
www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Auditor/Level_3_-_General/PoliceStaffingFinalRpt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LUL2-QK4J] (finding that, in 2002, “[t]he cost of a patrol officer [was] nearly
twice the cost of a [civilian community service officer]”).
261 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 257, at 9-10.
262 Id. at 23-24 (finding that twelve percent of police departments assign “[c]rime analysis/crime
mapping/intelligence” solely to civilians and nineteen percent assign those responsibilities to both
civilians and sworn officers).
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women came into policing, it was through a social work door.263 Mina van
Winkle was a well-to-do suffragist who directed the Women’s Bureau in the
Metropolitan D.C. police department in the 1920s.264 She said, presciently,
that “[p]olice work is social work, and until it is included in social service we
shall continue to pass delinquents from one agency to another, and then from
reformatory to jail, workhouse, and prison.”265
Policing agencies can be resistant to embedding social workers—the
NYPD had no social worker on staff as of 2008—but there have been notable
successes.266 An extensive investigation conducted by a number of North
Carolina entities—governmental, policing, academic—pointed to several
policing agencies that had experimented and obtained positive results with
having social workers on staff.267 In Lumberton, North Carolina, the
Lumberton Police Department found that “intervention by social workers has
virtually eliminated repeat calls from chronic problem homes” even enabling
them to move on to treatment for crime victims.268 Chapel Hill housed Crisis
Intervention Counselors in the PD precisely because “the police are the entity
that receives the initial call for service around the clock and provides 24-hour
assistance.”269 In 1998 that unit responded to over 8,000 calls.270 Many were
emergencies, ranging from sexual assault to death notifications to hostage
situations to domestic violence.271 Less emergent calls involved domestic
disputes, child abuse, dealing with the elderly, or repeat medical calls.272
Chapel Hill reported eventually fully integrating its social services. Said the
Chief: “If we lost one Crisis Intervention Counselor, I would have to hire two
police officers with less of an effect.”273 Despite the payoff, the idea of
combining policing and social work still encounters resistance, as no doubt it
does with other specialties. This needs to change.
Indeed, perhaps the time has come to reconceive policing agencies
entirely, such that those who exercise force and law—what we think of today
as the backbone of policing—are just one specialization. At present there are
about 700,000 sworn officers in the United States, trained primarily in force
263 See Albert R. Roberts, Police Social Workers: A History, 21 SOC. WORK 294, 294-95 (1976)
(tracing the “police social worker movement” back to the creation of women’s bureaus within police
departments starting in 1910).
264 Id. at 295.
265 Id. at 296.
266 See Patterson, supra note 164 (finding no positions for civilian social workers within the NYPD).
267 DEAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 22-38.
268 Id. at 24.
269 Id. at 28.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 29.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 28.
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and law.274 What would it mean to turn the use of force and law—but
particularly force—from a generalist function to a specialist one?
Would having some police specialize in the use of force be a good or bad
idea? One could argue it both ways, and in truth there is both a need for, and
room for, experimentation. In the military, some of the deadliest units also
are the most disciplined.275 They have a job to do and do it surgically. On the
other hand, we’re unlikely to get that same quality in a dispersed set of units
in 18,000 agencies—or even just the larger ones. Having police force
specialists might create a uniquely dangerous set of individuals who still
believe the real work of policing is force.
Given technological advances, there’s even an interesting question of
whether police officers on the ground should necessarily decide when to use
force. The whole focus of force training now is to slow things down. If force
is moved from foreground to background, so that its use presumably is less
frequent, and if things are slowed down, might supervisors—using streaming
body camera footage and with audio contact with officers—give advice on
when force is appropriate? This would permit someone less caught up in the
heat of the moment, and presumably more experienced, to offer guidance—
recognizing that might not always be possible in the spur of the moment. Yet,
slowing down the use of force is one of the key goals of “de-escalation.”
B. What Are the Police Doing Here? Rethinking Government’s
Response to Social Problems
Although the very concept of a policing agency clearly needs rethinking,
there’s reason to wonder whether that solution itself is too partial. It neglects
the fact that the problems the police encounter are not going to be solved by
the police alone, or even by the police at all. What is needed, at the least, is
co-response by the police and other agencies, as well as inter-agency
coordination. And in many situations it might be best to remove the police
altogether. “[A] reimagined criminal justice,” states Bruce Western, “will
concede some jurisdiction over the policy task of public safety to other
agencies—departments of housing, child services, public health, education,

274 SHELLEY S. HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., LOCAL POLICE
DEPARTMENTS, 2016: PERSONNEL 1 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd16p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZV4E-ZZQ4].
275 Clyde Haberman, Special Ops Forces: How Elite Forces Became Military Muscle, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/special-ops-retro.html [https://perma.cc/
9YMR-GYR8] (exploring America’s reliance on a “well-trained, disciplined force of special
operators groomed for counterterrorism, hostage rescue and other demanding missions”).
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and labor.”276 Some of what is required even may best be privatized, such as
violence interruption.277
The police themselves realize all too well that they are at best a band-aid
on the chronic social problems they encounter. When responding to calls for
service, one might think in terms of “response,” “stabilization,” and
“prevention.”278 The police can do the first, and help with the second, but that
is when their capabilities run out—unless they have social workers on staff.279
Even if they do, though, police officials are not going to provide the longterm attention needed to address a complicated situation. The very nature of
the policing function is that the police come, they do their thing, and they
leave. Discussing domestic violence, one police leader said, “[p]olice
intervention in the battering of women is like using aspirin for severe
infections. I can give immediate help, perhaps stop the violence, pick him up
and arrest him” but that is not going to address the long-term situation.280
The need for inter-agency cooperation seems apparent, yet
“[t]raditionally, law enforcement and human service agencies share the most
difficult portion of the others’ client caseloads but there has been little
interagency communication or cooperation.”281 In an extended experiment in
the United Kingdom, the police partnered with government agencies to
address the panoply of issues faced by a number of troubled communities.282
A Chief Superintendent who came to view the work in progress left
impressed with the way they were dealing with problems “at the root cause
level rather than just dealing with the symptoms.”283 He stressed the need “to
problem-solve with other agencies, not just to go ‘all guns blazing’ and
pretend they could fix all the problems alone.”284 Commenting on CIT
training around mental illness, one officer in the United States said, “The
training is great, but it’s not magic . . . . The thing that actually transforms
the way the system works is when everyone gets together.”285

WESTERN, supra note 243, at 183.
See Peter Hermann, He Used to Sell Drugs on D.C. Streets. Now He’s Paid to Make Them Safer.,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/heused-to-sell-drugs-on-dc-streets-now-hes-paid-to-make-them-safer/2018/12/13/eea91b66-e12e-11e8ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html [https://perma.cc/AHD9-RG2S] (describing violence interruption).
278 See DEAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 12 (identifying these three stages).
279 See id. at 14-15 (“With area wide, twenty-four hour coverage, only police can provide immediate
response and stabilization. But police calls without follow up services are little more than band-aids.”).
280 Eli Buchbinder & Zvi Eisikovits, Collaborative Discourse: The Case of Police and Social Work
Relationships in Intimate Violence Intervention in Israel, 34 J. SOC. SERV. RSCH., Oct. 2008, at 1, 4.
281 DEAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 5.
282 MCCARTHY, supra note 217, at 138-39.
283 Id. at 139.
284 Id.
285 Goode, supra note 130.
276
277
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Without ultimately judging whether it is best to involve or remove
police—again, experimentation is needed—there are promising collaborative
inter-agency projects occurring throughout the country. Many places in the
United States are experimenting with co-responder models, in which police
join with mental health or social work colleagues from outside the problem
to address persistent issues for which force and law are inapt responses.
NYPD’s program to put police and social workers together in the subway
began in 2014; in its first few months it put 388 people in shelters, compared
with 63 the previous year.286 Mayor Bill de Blasio announced a program to
centralize mental health services and coordinate them better in an effort to
avoid enforcement; as a report on the program explained, “[f]or people who
are sick, we will offer healthcare, not handcuffs.”287 Today there are many
variants of the Memphis Model of critical incident response—primarily
dealing with calls involving people in behavioral crisis—in which police and
mental health professionals tackle problems from a public health and nonenforcement perspective.288 Another prominent example is homeless
outreach teams, such as those deployed in Sarasota or Houston, in which the
goal is to provide needed services to people who lack housing.289 HELP
Honolulu is a program to pair up social workers and police to deal with
homelessness.290 The police put on street clothes, and get a better perspective
on “what the social service side is doing . . . . Now they can understand the
issues and address the larger problems rather than just saying, ‘[m]ove it
along.’”291 Simple solutions emerge, such as police offering rides to shelters
BRATTON, supra note 148, at 4.
Id. at 5.
See, e.g., Alayna Alvarez, Denver’s Police Co-Responder Program Renewed for Another Year, COLO.
POLITICS (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.coloradopolitics.com/denver/denver-police-s-co-responderprogram-renewed-for-another-year/article_5bc47676-41ca-11ea-bf2e-2363816fe0cb.html [https://perma.cc/
Y4M8-KPJ9] (reporting on Denver’s decision to extend its partnership between police and mental health
professionals); Tucson Police Mental Health Support Team, CITY OF TUCSON, https://www.tucsonaz.gov/
police/mental-health-support-team-mhst [https://perma.cc/LQ7N-MQ42] (describing the duties of the
city’s new mental health response team); Jocelyn Wiener, Rethinking 911: New California Efforts Seek to Shift
Mental-Health Calls Away from Police, DESERT SUN (July 5, 2020, 12:38 PM), https://www.desertsun.com/
story/news/crime_courts/2020/07/05/efforts-grow-rethink-911-find-alternative-mental-health-crises/
5380206002 [https://perma.cc/H9W9-U855] (explaining that the local government increased access to
emergency mental health services).
289 Homeless Outreach Team (HOT), HOUS. POLICE DEP’T, https://www.houstoncit.org/hot
[https://perma.cc/FZ37-5AHX]; Homeless Outreach Team, SARASOTA POLICE, https://www.
sarasotapd.org/about-us/homeless-outreach-team [https://perma.cc/PTP9-3KJ3]; see also Homeless
Services: Who to Call, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, https://www.sandiego.gov/homeless-services/call
[https://perma.cc/Z2YW-CKSQ] (describing San Diego’s homeless outreach team).
290 See Dan Nakaso, Social Service Workers and Police Join Forces to Aid Homeless, STAR
ADVERTISER (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.staradvertiser.com/2017/08/11/hawaii-news/social-serviceworkers-and-police-join-forces-to-aid-homeless [https://perma.cc/XN37-C3W6] (explaining the
H.E.L.P. Honolulu program that pairs social workers and police to help the homeless).
291 Id.
286
287
288
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rather than having to wait for the issuance of vouchers for cabs. The Martinsburg
(W. Va.) Initiative pairs police, mental health, and substance abuse professionals
to reach out to kids whose parents are struggling with addiction; the idea is to
offer a whole suite of services to help the kids now and avoid another generation
of addiction and drug abuse down the line.292 The Community Connection
Center in Salt Lake City, Utah relies on police, social workers, and homeless
advocates working together to triage short-term intervention.293
When inter-agency approaches are adopted at present, they sometimes
neglect some of the agencies that are needed most. It’s not uncommon to bring
together a variety of agencies in collaborative ways, especially when dealing with
troubled youth.294 Prosecutors, cops, judges, some community groups, parks and
recreation, maybe the schools. But too rarely do these inter-agency teams include
professionals that deal with health, with employment, with social services.
A particularly pressing question is whether, for many calls for assistance,
the police are needed at all. When the police are involved, enforcement always
is a possibility; without them there, it is much less so (though the police
always can be called, of course). As Monica Bell points out, “routing
rehabilitation and social services through the police could perversely widen
the carceral net and reify the ‘culture of control.’”295 Police, by their nature,
“may be more punitive or less empathetic than the average civil servant.”296
On the other hand, involving the police paradoxically might well add a benefit
that often is overlooked: their capacity to get other agencies to do their job.
In Lumberton, the police found they were dealing with people who had
exhausted the patience or resources of other agencies.297 But it turned out the
police both could convince recalcitrant repeat callers to be more cooperative
with government, and persuade the agencies to step back in to help.298
Today, some jurisdictions are experimenting with eliminating the police
entirely from certain categories of calls. Perhaps the most well-known is Crisis
Assistance Helping Out on the Streets, or CAHOOTS, run by the White Bird
Clinic and operating out of Eugene and Springfield, Oregon. CAHOOTS
responds to a totally different phone number from 911, though it runs out of
Eugene’s central dispatch. It provides a raft of services without police
292 The Martinsburg Initiative, MARTINSBURG POLICE, http://www.martinsburgpd.org/
martinsburg-initiative [https://perma.cc/TW9Y-GEDL].
293 Community Connection Center, SALT LAKE CITY POLICE DEP’T, http://www.slcpd.com/
resources/ccc [https://perma.cc/67X8-VXYG].
294 See generally SARAH S. PEARSON & SONIA JURICH, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, YOUTH
COURT: A COMMUNITY SOLUTION FOR EMBRACING AT-RISK YOUTH (2005), https://
www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/aypf/youth_court_community_solutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4HD-2A74].
295 Bell, supra note 79, at 2147 (quoting DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001)).
296 Id. at 2148.
297 DEAN ET AL., supra note 116, at 9.
298 Id. at 44.
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responders, including addressing conflict resolution, substance abuse and crisis
counseling, and dealing with those facing housing crises.299 Police can be called
if needed, but apparently this has been in relatively few cases overall.300
Berkeley, California recently announced it was dispensing with police for traffic
enforcement, using unarmed Department of Transportation officials instead.301
San Francisco similarly has decided to no longer have police respond to “noncriminal” matters like neighbor disputes, school discipline issues, and calls
about homeless individuals, opting instead for unarmed professionals.302
Albuquerque is adding a whole new third sort of first-responder—like
CAHOOTS but with municipal employees—to its dispatch services.303
Nor is it clear why the trope about the police being the only ones to
respond 24/7 should remain true. Even where force, and thus a police
response, is needed, having other resources immediately available can be
crucial. Family and relationship problems, mental health issues—these are
situations that “respond far better to social and psychological remedies” than
they do to force and law approaches.304 And these sorts of matters do not arise
only during “working hours.”
Making these programs work will require attention to one of the more
neglected, but essential, aspects of municipal services: dispatch. It’s
impossible to get the help to people that need it without some sort of
centralized dispatch, and in most places, dispatch is tied to police, fire, and
emergency medical, but not all these other responses. Here too, though, there
is progress being made. Houston, Texas, has established a 911 Crisis Call
Diversion (“CCD”) program, by which dispatchers identify and refer
qualifying nonemergency mental health-related calls for immediate

299

CAHOOTS, WHITE BIRD CLINIC, https://whitebirdclinic.org/cahoots [https://perma.cc/CW57-

CPWC].
300 See Scottie Andrew, This Town of 170,000 Replaced Some Cops with Medics and Mental Health Workers.
It’s Worked for over 30 Years, CNN (July 5, 2020, 10:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/05/us/cahootsreplace-police-mental-health-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/D25K-MDML] (“Per self-reported data,
CAHOOTS workers responded to 24,000 calls in 2019—about 20% of total dispatches. About 150 of those
required police backup.”).
301 Kea Wilson, Berkeley to Become the First US City to De-Cop Traffic Enforcement,
STREETSBLOG USA (July 16, 2020), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2020/07/16/berkeley-to-becomethe-first-us-city-to-de-cop-traffic-enforcement [https://perma.cc/FU8S-Y96D].
302 Olga R. Rodriguez, San Francisco Police Won’t Respond to Non-Criminal Calls, NBC (June 12,
2020, 10:11 AM), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/san-francisco-police-wont-respond-tonon-criminal-calls/2307892 [https://perma.cc/3LRR-PY4A].
303 Mayor Tim Keller to Refocus Millions in Public Safety Resources with First-of-its-Kind Civilian
Response Department, CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE (June 15, 2020), https://www.cabq.gov/
mayor/news/mayor-tim-keller-to-refocus-millions-in-public-safety-resources-with-first-of-its-kindcivilian-response-department [https://perma.cc/96AP-PHH6].
304 Michaels & Treger, supra note 163, at 67-68.
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connection to a phone counselor.305 Washington, D.C. similarly has adopted
a dispatch model in which emergency room triage nurses sit alongside 911
dispatchers and can set up medical appointments and arrange rides for
nonemergency calls (such as for sprained ankles or coughs).306 The Tucson
Police Department has yet another alternative call response model to address
lower-level calls, including using non-sworn personnel to handle calls over
the phone (such as for ongoing neighborhood concerns), creating an internet
reporting tool, and creating a Collision Reporting Center for reports of
property damage.307 One of the pressing questions is how dispatchers assess
risk—can calls be handled without force present, or with it in the background.
Minneapolis is one city trying to work through these questions.308 More
study, though, is urgently needed.
City planners also must start to think in terms of constructing places that
meet the needs of those whose conduct ends up being criminalized. This is
true even if, or especially if, the activities of those individuals are seen as
“incivilities.” Urban design is used to drive the homeless away, but they need
a place to go.309 They need bathrooms. If we don’t want folks drinking out on
the street, maybe we need to construct places for this to happen: those of us
who can afford it go to bars or party in our homes. A model here is the longrunning war between skateboarders and members of the public who believe
they create some sort of danger, and the efforts to make civic spaces
inhospitable to them. One answer has been ensuring there are skateparks for
those who want to use them.310
Finally, what may well be required is an entirely new form of central
coordination to deal with chronic public health and public safety issues. In
many mayors’ offices there is some high-level official charged with dealing with

305 Crisis Call Diversion Program (CCD), HOUS. POLICE DEP’T, MENTAL HEALTH DIV.,
https://www.houstoncit.org/ccd [https://perma.cc/BN34-RMJ2] (reporting that, in 2017, the
program resulted in 2,151 diversions away from responses by patrol officers).
306 Selena Simmons-Duffin, Can Triage Nurses Help Prevent 911 Overload?, NPR (Apr. 19, 2018,
5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/04/19/601987914/can-triage-nurses-helpprevent-911-overload [https://perma.cc/QU2R-QMZW].
307 Chris Magnus, Chris Magnus: Tucson Police Department Meeting the Challenges of a Growing
Call Load, TUCSON.COM (Aug. 10, 2018), https://tucson.com/opinion/local/chris-magnus-tucsonpolice-department-meeting-the-challenges-of-a/article_fadd501a-aa91-5db7-b939-7bb9f12d41bb.html
[https://perma.cc/89PT-LD26].
308 See CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, 911/MPD WORKGROUP RECOMENDATIONS 1, 4 (2019),
https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/Download/File/3043/MPD%20911%20Workgroup%20Recommen
dations%20Presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UNF-6GH6].
309 See Robert Rosenberger, How Cities Use Design to Drive Homeless People Away, ATLANTIC
(June 19, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/06/how-cities-use-design-todrive-homeless-people-away/373067 [https://perma.cc/QH6K-85BK] (describing how urban
planning and design deliberately prevents homeless people from sleeping in public spaces).
310 Id.
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“public safety,” but this typically means crime and police.311 Why is there not a
deputy mayor for public safety whose job is coordinating agencies to tackle
what plainly are interdisciplinary problems? There are ongoing experiments
with merging police and health data to identify frequent users of these services
who need a new response.312 We should be doing this from the top down.
Although the good news is that many jurisdictions are experimenting with
new alternatives, there looks to be far too little rigorous study of them. Too
much is happening within city silos, without careful evaluation to determine
whether the program works. There will be enthusiasm to export some of these
ideas to different places, but how will we know which are worthy of
replicating, and which are not?
C. Policing as Triage and Emergency Medicine
So far, the discussion has focused on specialization to address the myriad
circumstances police presently confront on the street, but there is one sense
in which specialization may be looking in the wrong direction. At bottom,
police are first responders, called to the scene by 911 operators. The difficulty
is that when they respond, they encounter a host of problems for which they
are ill-trained. In the midst of much conversation about reducing the
footprint of policing, however, there is insufficient recognition of the fact that
when all is said and done, first responders will remain essential.
What we need, perhaps, are generalist-trained dispatch and responder
teams who can better handle the first moments of a problem, ultimately
handing it off to other social service or (if necessary) criminal justice agencies.
Imagine emergency vehicles racing around a city with the words “First”
emblazoned on the side, rather than “police.” And imagine a response that is
focused not on force and law—though those will be available when needed—
but optimizing outcomes in both the short and long term.
We have available an analogy, which is the way we currently handle
medical emergencies and hospital emergency room intake. Many of the calls
to 911 are for medical emergencies to which emergency medical technicians
(“EMTs”), but not necessarily police, are dispatched. Emergency rooms often
are the dumping ground for social ills, the next stop for many folks the police

311 See, e.g., Mayor’s Office of Public Safety, L.A. MAYOR, https://www.lamayor.org/mayors-officepublic-safety [https://perma.cc/KH54-SQHM] (“The Mayor’s Office of Public Safety . . . oversees
initiatives . . . . [ranging] from improving cybersecurity, securing our ports and airports, and
countering violent extremism to reducing gun violence, improving resilience, combating human
trafficking, and halting the scourge of domestic violence.”).
312 See Anne Milgram, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, https://policingequity.org/component/
k2/amilgram?highlight=WyJpbmRpYW5hcG9saXMiXQ [https://perma.cc/W64Y-4X9F] (describing
one such experiment in Indianapolis).
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or EMTs pick up, and the destination of plenty who get there on their own.313
The medical emergency system does two things we should ask of 911
dispatchers and first responders. First, they triage problems. They have
intricate systems of scoring need and immediacy of attention to handle the
flow through their doors.314 Then, callers to 911 and ER patients are treated
by personnel—EMTs and emergency medicine physicians—whose specialty
really is being a generalist. They go through extensive training to be able to
deal with a wide host of complicated problems, at least well enough to
stabilize patients until they can be seen by someone else.315
The place to start is with dispatch, which needs to be re-designed to work
with first responders to triage the calls police receive. Over 200 million calls
are made to 911 each year.316 A high percentage of these are not emergencies,
and cities are trying to teach callers to use 311 as an alternative.317 What
desperately is needed for 911, though, is to direct the right responders to the
situation, and provide the correct information to them. The responder need
not, and perhaps should not, be a cop. Just as we don’t dispatch the police to
put out fires or treat people having heart attacks, it is not clear that we should
do so for the mentally ill or those experiencing drug overdoses either. If
necessary, we might co-dispatch. Force may be needed in the background, but
it should be kept there when other professionals could do better dealing
immediately with the situation.
Emergency medical services (“EMS”) providers provide an analogy to
how we ought to handle more calls to 911. EMS professionals often do not

313 See Daniel Aexelson, Matthew J. Stull & Wendy C. Coates, Social Determinants of Health: A
Missing Link in Emergency Medicine Training, 2 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. EDUC. & TRAINING 66,
66 (2017) (discussing the need to train emergency medicine physicians to recognize and treat “social
determinants of health”).
314 See N ICKI G ILBOY , P AULA T ANABE , D EBBIE T RAVERS & A LEXANDER M. R OSENAU ,
A GENCY FOR H EALTHCARE R SCH. & Q UALITY, E MERGENCY S EVERITY INDEX (ESI): A
T RIAGE T OOL FOR E MERGENCY D EPARTMENT C ARE 2 (2011), https://emscimprovement.
center/documents/107/ESI_Handbook2125.pdf [https://perma.cc/47QC-6LE4] [hereinafter
E MERGENCY S EVERITY INDEX] (describing how the medical emergency response system at
emergency departments triages problems as they arise).
315 See Emergency Medicine, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://freida.ama-assn.org/specialty/emergencymedicine [https://perma.cc/GL8G-XX5V] (describing the responsibilities of emergency medicine
physicians); EMR vs. EMT, STAN. MED. EMT PROGRAM, https://med.stanford.edu/emt/what-isan-emt.html [https://perma.cc/3M8V-9FD6] (describing the duties of EMTs).
316 911.GOV, NATIONAL 911 PROGRESS REPORT 11 (2019), https://www.911.gov/pdf/National911-Program-Profile-Database-Progress-Report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/47CT-DPZN].
317 See, e.g., Make the Right Call—When to Call 911 or 311, CHI311 (Dec. 16, 2018), https://311.
chicago.gov/s/article/Make-the-right-call-when-to-call-911-or-311 [https://perma.cc/R8NF-L2H5]
(instructing residents to “[c]all 3-1-1 to request City Services and to report situations not requiring
a police response”).
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really know what they are getting into until they show up on scene.318 EMS
workers triage problems, ascertaining the immediate needs of the patient and
ensuring an individual patient is transported to a facility best equipped to
manage their specific injuries.319 They sometimes must sort among patients
and prioritize care in mass casualty incidents or other instances with
insufficient resources.320 EMS workers are required to know how to treat
everything from cardiac arrest, to a broken femur, to emergency childbirth.321
The same is true of emergency room triage and emergency room doctors.
Emergency room triage has an intricate system for scoring need and directing
resources to those who need them most immediately.322 Patients in the ER
then are seen by doctors who essentially specialize in being generalists.
Emergency physicians are trained and certified to evaluate a patient’s
circumstances, stabilize the situation, and then address it either through
immediate care, or through admission to a facility. They deal with a wide
range of medical issues, from relatively simple injuries to caring for
chronically ill or critically injured people.323 Emergency physicians often are
able to treat and discharge patients without resorting to hospital admission.324
A really groundbreaking solution might be to replace our traditional
notion of police with a set of highly-trained first responders who have the
318 See, e.g., Nicole Lurie, Gregg S. Margolis & Kristin L. Rising, The US Emergency Care System:
Meeting Everyday Acute Care Needs While Being Ready for Disasters, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 2166, 2168 (2013),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2013.0771 [https://perma.cc/X2XQ-Z5EW].
319 See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Guidelines for Field Triage of Injured Patients:
Recommendations of the National Expert Panel on Field Triage, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. RECOMMENDATIONS & REPS., Jan. 23, 2009, at 1, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/
rr/rr5801.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3Q6-F9X3] (describing the EMS decision scheme for “field
triage”); Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Guidelines for Field Triage of Injured Patients:
Recommendations of the National Expert Panel on Field Triage, 2011, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. RECOMMENDATIONS & REPS., Jan. 13, 2012, at 1, https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr6101a1.htm [https://perma.cc/2RAB-4C7Z].
320 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., MODEL UNIFORM CORE CRITERIA FOR
MASS CASUALTY INCIDENT TRIAGE (2017), https://www.ems.gov/pdf/education/National-EMSEducation-Standards-and-Instructional-Guidelines/MUCC_Addendum_Paramedic.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JHG7-FMYU]; see also EMERGENCY SEVERITY INDEX, supra note 314.
321 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2018 NATIONAL EMS SCOPE OF
PRACTICE MODEL 32-38 (2018), https://nasemso.org/wp-content/uploads/Prepublication-DisplayCopy-2018-National-EMS-Scope-of-Practice-Model-20180929.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z687-6HGH]
(listing necessary skills for EMS workers).
322 EMERGENCY SEVERITY INDEX, supra note 314.
323 See Emergency Medicine, AM. BD. MED. SPECIALTIES, https://www.abms.org/memberboards/contact-an-abms-member-board/american-board-of-emergency-medicine [https://perma.cc
/7FKS-AHU7]; KRISTY GONZALEZ MORGANTI, SEBASTIAN BAUHOFF, JANICE C. BLANCHARD,
MAHSHID ABIR, NEEMA IYER, ALEXANDRIA C. SMITH, JOSEPH V. VESELY, EDWARD N. OKEKE
& ARTHUR L. KELLERMAN, RAND CORP., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR280/RAND_RR280.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSC9-KEAZ].
324 Id. at 11, 24.
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capacity to address all the sorts of social problems police today face, from
domestic violence to substance abuse to noise complaints.325 These
individuals would go through intensive training—one could imagine a fouryear degree, in fact. They would learn basic medical care for physical and
mental illness. They would learn dispute resolution, how to diagnose social
problems from a social work perspective, and about the availability of social
services in the jurisdictions in which they serve. They also would be trained
in the use of force, and in law. They would exercise the latter skills if
absolutely necessary. But they would be rewarded for stabilizing situations
and solving problems without resort to force or law. That would be their point
of pride. And they would have the capacity to call in other agencies as a
follow-up to address on a longer-term basis the precise problem they
encountered. With this sort of system, we may find we can achieve optimal,
long-term solutions to problems that evade resolution today.
D. Cost and Criminalization
Changes of the sort discussed here may well be expensive. If so, it is fair
to ask where the resources would come from to provide for all the additional
training, the specialization, the reorganization. But the answer may be—and
we lack the data to know for sure—far less elusive than it seems.
In this country, we criminalize like crazy.326 The books are full of laws that
make perfectly ordinary conduct illegal.327 New York City’s administrative
code is a wonder of prohibitions, from putting on street shows from the
window of your apartment to selling laser pointers to children under
eighteen.328 Some of the laws exist because of accretion. We add things and
don’t subtract.329 (Street juggling is banned; apparently juggling was a serious
concern in the early 1800s.)330 Some criminal laws exist because they are a
cheap way to play to public sensibilities in response to a problem or some

Friedman, supra note 21.
See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW (2008); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005);
Overcriminalization, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/heritage-explains/
overcriminalization [https://perma.cc/H7J3-RCU9].
327 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 149, at 515-16 (collecting examples of unusual state criminal offenses).
328 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-114(b) (street shows); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-134.2(b)
(laser pointers).
329 See Stuntz, supra note 149, at 592 (noting that legislative inertia results in “the statute books
contain[ing] a host of crimes that are not crimes at all in terms of popular understandings”).
330 See id. at 556 (“Though it sounds odd to twenty-first century ears, in mid- to latenineteenth century cities, juggling was associated with fraud and street disorder.”).
325
326
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salient event.331 Others exist because prosecutors and police lobby for them,
to give them more muscle when they want it.332
Criminalization causes us to deploy police resources in poor ways. If the
police are busy chasing after fairly minor things, in part because someone up
the food chain has mandated doing so, they aren’t doing something more
productive, like keeping the streets safe. The number of arrests for marijuana
possession in New York has been staggering to behold. And to what good end
precisely, other than to paste Black and Brown people with records that are
not attaching themselves to the many people who—if my nose serves
correct—are smoking marijuana in my neighborhood?333
Criminalization also keeps us from looking at more efficacious and costeffective solutions. Criminalization is the “cheap” way out. Cheap is in scare
quotes because it is only seemingly cheap, the instant solution to every social
problem. Compared with alternative ways of dealing with difficulties,
criminalization has proven extremely expensive to us as a society.334
We have seen some notable successes in innovation around public safety,
which achieve non-criminal outcomes and at lower costs. The Memphis
Model of “critical incident training,” mentioned above, for dealing with the
mentally ill is one such innovation. A cost-benefit analysis in Louisville,
Kentucky showed over $1 million savings annually, without even taking into
account nonmonetary benefits and the saved costs of injuries to police and
others.335 Elsewhere, evaluations of CIT training show hugely positive
outcomes: fewer injuries, less use of force, and a greater willingness to call
331 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 751-52 (2005) (describing
how politicians enact criminal prohibitions and harsh sentences in response to the public perception
of crime rates).
332 See id. at 728 (“Prosecutors have an incentive to lobby for harsher sentences because longer
sentences make it easier for them to obtain convictions through plea bargaining.”); Stuntz, supra
note 149, at 533-39 (describing the incentives for police and prosecutors to seek expanded criminal
codes in order to reduce the cost of arresting and prosecuting criminal defendants).
333 See Benjamin Mueller, Robert Gebeloff & Sahil Chinoy, Surest Way to Face Marijuana
Charges in New York: Be Black or Hispanic, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/13/nyregion/marijuana-arrests-nyc-race.html [https://perma.cc/4WBU-U34Q] (“There are
many ways to be arrested on marijuana charges, but one pattern has remained true through years of
piecemeal policy changes in New York: The primary targets are black and Hispanic people.”).
334 See Barack Obama, Commentary, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
HARV. L. REV. 811, 818 (2017) (“If one includes the cost of jail and prison at the state and local level, the
total U.S. budget for incarceration rises to a staggering $81 billion, enough to fund transformative initiatives
like universal preschool for every three- and four-year-old in America . . . .” (footnote omitted)); John Pfaff,
The Incalculable Costs of Mass Incarceration, APPEAL (Sept. 20, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-incalculablecosts-of-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/7W4Q-ZEDP] (arguing that the cost of incarceration is
underestimated because standard measures do not account for the social costs of incarceration).
335 See Peggy L. El-Mallakh, Kranti Kiran & Rif S. El-Mallakh, Costs and Savings Associated
with Implementation of a Police Crisis Intervention Team, 107 S. MED. J. 391, 394 (2014) (citing an annual
cost savings of $1,024,897).

996

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 925

the police for help.336 In Central Florida, the arrest rate after CIT
implementation was found to be very low and even declined across time,
providing evidence that CIT programs may indeed be useful in reducing
discretionary arrests, specifically among persons with mental illnesses.337
Similarly, Seattle has had remarkable success with its LEAD (Law
Enforcement Assisted Diversion) approach to drug offenses, which—for
nonviolent and non-predatory behavior—substitutes social work for criminal
penalties.338 Studies show that at least for some portion of the homeless
population in this country—the chronically homeless, or those suffering from
mental illness—permanent supportive housing programs actually are cheaper
than cycling repeatedly through the criminal justice system.339
As Bruce Western says, “[c]riminal justice is a poor instrument for social
policy because at its core, it is a blaming institution.”340 It is not clear that the
homeless, the mentally ill, and those addicted to drugs and alcohol, are
336 See DAVE MCCLURE ET AL., URB. INST., PAY FOR SUCCESS AND THE CRISIS
INTERVENTION TEAM MODEL 22 fig.2 (2017) (listing examples of measurable positive outcomes of
CIT training); Henry J. Steadman, Martha Williams Deane, Randy Borum & Joseph P. Morrissey,
Comparing Outcomes of Major Models of Police Responses to Mental Health Emergencies, 51 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS. 645, 645 (2000) (“Our data strongly suggest that collaborations between the criminal justice
system, the mental health system, and the advocacy community plus essential services reduce the
inappropriate use of U.S. jails to house persons with acute symptoms of mental illness.”).
337 Stephanie Franz & Randy Borum, Crisis Intervention Teams May Prevent Arrests of People
with Mental Illness, 12 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 265, 269 (2011).
338 See SEEMA L. CLIFASEFI, HEATHER S. LONCZAK & SUSAN E. COLLINS, UNIV. OF
WASH. HARBORVIEW MED. CTR., LEAD PROGRAM EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF LEAD ON
HOUSING, EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME/BENEFITS 2-3 (2016), http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/
static/f/1185392/27047605/1464389327667/housing_employment_evaluation_final.PDF?token=J65k
05f8n7Js86G5r6lsPgujOog%3D [http://perma.cc/XVA8-DH68] (finding that participants were
significantly more likely to obtain housing, employment, and legitimate income subsequent to their
LEAD referral compared to the month prior to their referral); POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., CRITICAL
ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: NEW CHALLENGES FOR POLICE: A HEROIN EPIDEMIC AND
CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD MARIJUANA 24 (2014), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/
docs/Critical_Issues_Series_2/a%20heroin%20epidemic%20and%20changing%20attitudes%20towar
d%20marijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QX9-33BP] (noting the numerous social services offered to
qualifying offenders in lieu of arrest, and the benefits obtained by the police department in the form
of both time and money).
339 See, e.g., DANIEL FLAMING, HALIL TOROS & PATRICK BURNS, ECON. ROUNDTABLE, HOME
NOT FOUND: THE COST OF HOMELESSNESS IN SILICON VALLEY 2 (2015), https://economicrt.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/Home_Not_Found_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7Z4-HZ54] (“By prioritizing
housing opportunities for the group of 2,800 persistently homeless individuals with the highest costs, it is
possible to obtain savings that more than offset the cost of housing.”); Dennis P. Culhane & Thomas Byrne,
Ending Chronic Homelessness: Cost-Effective Opportunities for Interagency Collaboration 21 (Mar. 1,
2020) (Working Paper, Univ. of Penn. Sch. of Soc. Pol’y & Prac.), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=spp_papers [https://perma.cc/NT3Z-U7E5] (“The collective
evidence from academic research as well as practice-based studies demonstrates that placing selected,
heaviest service using, and therefore most costly, chronically homeless individuals in permanent housing can
yield cost savings, as service reductions more than offset housing costs.”).
340 WESTERN, supra note 243, at 185.
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blameworthy in any classic sense. And though we may want to use the
criminal law to deter behaviors, to send a message, the question is whether
what we are doing is effective. Or are we cutting off our noses to spite our
faces, by deploying a costly criminal justice system in a way that does not
deter or solve the problem, but instead leaves us with a bigger mess that we
then need to try to sweep under the rug. Part I made apparent that deploying
the criminal law is not solving these costly problems; it is just cycling the
same people through the system.
To be clear, these are serious problems, and they often seem intractable.
One homeless advocate explains that we criminalize so much because of
“compassion fatigue” and a seeming lack of alternatives.341 But often some
creativity and inter-agency cooperation can lead to innovations that work
and—once again—we need a more deliberate and sustained way of
discovering them and putting them in place. Because what we are doing now
is not working, and not working in a costly way.
CONCLUSION
Too much of what we treat through the criminal law and agencies of law
enforcement are really problems of public health and social welfare. For
various reasons, it has become our default to address them with the police
power, literally, in the name of “public safety.” But it is not at all clear we are
achieving that safety, and certainly not in optimal ways. We can and must do
better.342

341 See Saelinger, supra note 171, at 554 (exploring how “compassion fatigue” led policymakers
to “endors[e] and pass[] anti-nuisance ordinances”).
342 See Barry Friedman, Taking Public Safety Seriously (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
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APPENDIX A: NASHVILLE CURRICULUM SUMMARY (RAW DATA)

BLOCK OF INSTRUCTION

POST
REQUIRED HOURS

2017 MNPD
REQUIRED HOURS

Firearms

48

99

Emergency Medical Training

10

17

Patrol Procedures

120

236

Interpersonal Communications

25

29

Professional and Ethical Conduct

3

6

Physical Defense Tactics

48

177

Criminal and Constitutional Law and Procedures

50

102

Written Communications

10

11

Human Relations

30

53

Criminal Justice System

11

20

Law Enforcement Stress

9

24

Administration

68

146.5
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Emergency Vehicle Operation

48

48.5

National Safety Council Defensive Driving Course

N/A

N/A

TOTAL

480

969

*

*

*

*

*

